As current Chair of the Arctic Council, Canada will host the biannual Ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, April 24-25, before handing over the reins to the United States. 

Canada has chaired the Council during a particularly fraught time, with geopolitical tensions simmering between Russia and the West over the crisis in Ukraine, and philosophical tensions rising between local and global visions for the Arctic.  As Canada prepares for the Ministerial, it is worth reviewing what went well, what went poorly and what to expect in Iqaluit.

The Aglukkaq Factor

The first indication that Canada’s chairmanship might be a little bit different was in the appointment by Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Minister of Health (now Environment) and Nunavut MP Leona Aglukkaq as Minister for the Arctic Council and Canada’s Chair of the Arctic Council – a role normally fulfilled by the Foreign Minister.  Aglukkaq began her appointment by conducting a tour of the territories as well as a handful of Nordic states to consult with Northerners and diplomats and solicit feedback on the Canadian priorities.  Announced in November 2012, the Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship agenda focused on “Development for the people of the North”, with sub-themes of responsible Arctic resource development, safe Arctic shipping, and sustainable circumpolar communities.

While the Arctic Council’s mandate includes both environmental protection and sustainable development, it has historically focused on the former. Canada’s agenda sought to re-emphasize sustainable development – which some critics derisively summarized as (gasp) economic development – and included the establishment of an Arctic Economic Council. This was met with criticism, as some commentators and environmentalists feared the Arctic states were opening up the region to industry and big business.

Aglukkaq was also publicly dismissive about the involvement, alternately, of scientists and non-Northerners in the Arctic.  While many in her home territory would echo the sentiment, many (non-Northern) others felt the Canadian Chairmanship was exclusive and parochial, focused on issues that were of interest to Canada domestically and Aglukkaq personally to the detriment of the many issues the forum had developed expertise and success with over the course of 15 years.

Other than the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council – and your air must be pretty rarefied if you believe business and economic development have no legitimate place in the Arctic – these worries have proven unfounded, and business as usual has reigned in the actual work of the Arctic Council. It is dominated, after all, by working groups and task forces that focus on environmental protection. More to the point, Aglukkaq has barely been heard from for the past two years.  Some may have hoped, or expected, that she would be a powerful Ambassador for the people of the Canadian Arctic and Circumpolar North, speaking at events and conferences, communicating the Arctic experience, expounding on her vision for the region and building political will for better or faster change. They will have been disappointed. 

Aglukkaq is ending her Chairmanship as she began it, with a tour of communities in Nunavut and NWT. But she has squandered the opportunity afforded by her position of improving Canada’s reputation and solidifying its status as a leader in Arctic affairs. 

The Bear in the Room

Of greater interest to the popular media has been the impact of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine on Arctic politics and regional relations. The crisis began half way through the Canadian Chairmanship, and just weeks before a Senior Arctic Officials meeting was scheduled in Yellowknife.  Canada had placed travel bans on some Russians and had the legal ability to exclude the Russian Senior Arctic Official in this case – but didn’t.  The meeting proceeded as planned, with Russian involvement, as have two other SAO meetings since.  No doubt the consequences of the Ukraine conflict has been a topic of personal discussion amongst Arctic diplomats, but publically it has not featured.

In fact the Arctic Council has remained very well insulated from broader geopolitics, with two relatively minor exceptions. Canada and the United States opted out of an Arctic Council Task Force meeting (on Black Carbon and Methane) as it was held in Moscow, on April 14-15, 2014, however there is little indication their absence impacted the work of the group significantly.  Three more TFBCM meetings in the six months subsequent enjoyed full participation from all Arctic member states. There are dozens of Arctic Council SAO, working group, task force and expert group meetings every year and this was the only one to be directly affected.

Perhaps more notable was the recent announcement by the Russian Embassy in Ottawa that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov would not be attending the Ministerial in Iqaluit due to “prior commitments”.  Russia will instead be represented by its Minister for the Environment, Sergei Donskoi. Lavrov has attended every Arctic Council Ministerial since 2004 and there should be no doubt that his absence is related to recent tensions with the West and particularly Canada’s aggressive rhetoric over Ukraine.  Although all parties are committed to maintaining cooperative relations within the work of the Arctic Council – where conveniently Canadian and Russian interests align – the prospect of a high level meeting was too much to bear.  Canadian officials had already cancelled the Arctic Council events that were to be held in Ottawa the day before the Ministerial – organized to accommodate the many Observers and representatives who could not logistically be included in Iqaluit – to avoid a scene where official Canada was seen to be feting the Russians right in the nation’s capital, in contravention to their ‘principled stance’ elsewhere.

Lavrov’s absence will have mostly symbolic impact, as Russia, like Canada, will still be represented by its Environment Minister, and the move has not been trumpeted as a boycott or political statement.  Indeed Russia announced the news on the Orthodox Easter holiday, presumably to tame speculation and fuss about Lavrov’s motives. The main output of the event, the Ministerial Declaration, is almost wholly drafted weeks and even months in advance and will have been agreed upon by the states and Permanent Participants beforehand. The decision seems to have everything to do with Ukraine and nothing to do with the Arctic Council. 

It’s further worth noting that Russia continues to co-chair two of the three Arctic Council task forces and participated in the first Arctic Coast Guard Forum experts’ meeting in Washington last month.  If this is the extent of the geopolitical spillover we can expect into Arctic affairs, it will confirm the Arctic region’s exceptionality in international relations.

Canada’s Record

Anecdotally, Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship has been mired in malaise, from criticism of the Arctic Economic Council to original SAO Chair Patrick Borbey’s untimely departure, and from the “boycott” of the Moscow meeting to general dissatisfaction with the Canadian management of the Council’s work.  But objectively it is hard to see the Canadian Chairmanship as anything but a continuation of the Arctic Council’s record of success. 

The Council is busier than ever.  Its tasks forces have proven productive, the working groups continue to provide world-class scientific recommendations and increasingly work on implementation. The management and communications of the Council have improved with the new Secretariat, and the influence of the Permanent Participants is stronger than ever.  Indeed the list of activities undertaken in the past two years is so long that it would be tedious to outline here (much of it is publically available in the Arctic Council documents section).  

Ministerial deliverables are likely to include a non-binding framework plan on oil pollution prevention; a Framework Document on Black Carbon and Methane, with quantitative goals to come later, in 2017; an Arctic Marine Strategic Plan for 2015-25; and recommendations for incorporating traditional and local knowledge into the work of the Arctic Council.  This is not breathtaking stuff, but it is entirely conventional.  The Canadian Chairmanship has been much more like other Chairmanships than it has been different.

Let’s See if You Can Do Better

If the means justify the ends, then Canada’s Chairmanship can be hailed a success.  Those who resent the Conservative’s foreign policy under Stephen Harper will find faults with the Ministerial and its outputs, but let them try to show objectively, and quantifiably, how it is lacking compared to its predecessors. 

Still, it has been painful to watch at times, particularly as a Canadian. If the work of the Council has gone ahead unmired, it has as often as not been despite Canada’s leadership of the forum. 

If misery loves company, though, it is reassuring to watch the United States go through many of the same growing pains as Canada suffered in its first Chairmanship year. The US seems to have learned all the wrong lessons from Canada’s mistakes, and a rift between Republican Alaska and Democratic Washington DC has emerged.  Admiral Papp is working diligently to navigate his way through the melee.

He needn’t work too hard; almost certainly, the Arctic Council will find a way to isolate itself from the politics. 

Related stories from around the North:  

Canada:  The Third Wheel: Observers in the Arctic Council, Blog by Heather Exner-Pirot

Denmark:  Nordics to step up security cooperation on perceived Russian threat, Yle News

Finland:  Survey – More than half of reservists in Finland pro-Nato, Yle News

Norway:  Peace and stability crucial for Arctic economy, Barents Observer

Russia: Fire-struck nuclear submarine to be repaired, Barents Observer

Sweden:  Russia concerned by Finland, Sweden moves towards closer ties with NATO, Radio Sweden

United States: Arctic priorities questioned on eve of U.S. chairmanship, Alaska Public Radio Network

Experts from all eight Arctic nations are gathering in the United States on Wednesday to sign a historic deal for their coast guards to work together in the treacherous but increasingly accessible waters of the North.

The two-day Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) Experts Meeting is scheduled to take place at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. It will bring together experts from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United States and Russia, despite initial Canadian objections over Russian participation.

“The ACGF will be an operationally-focused organization that strengthens maritime cooperation and coordination in the Arctic,” said Lisa Novak, a spokesperson for the U.S. Coast Guard. “The Forum will help to implement Arctic Council agreements, but also acts as an independent body making its own decisions and work plans that focus on Arctic operations.”

Novak said the impetus for creating the ACGF grew out of the concerns of Arctic Council member countries over the increasing need to ensure safety, security, and stewardship of Arctic waters.

The forum will also discuss emergency response, icebreaking and collaboration, said a statement from the Canadian government.

“The heads of the eight coast guard agencies, including Canada, have agreed that collaboration on such operational matters is to everyone’s benefit,” said Carole Swaindon of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, which runs the Canadian Coast Guard.

Canada snubbed Russia over Ukraine

The forum was to have been created in Canada in March 2014.

An agreement in principle had been reached and the final deal was supposed to have been signed. But negotiations were delayed when the Harper government refused to allow Russian officials to take part.

“The (Prime Minister’s Office) insisted the Russians not be invited because of the Ukraine,” said John Higginbotham, who attended that meeting as a fellow of Carleton University’s Centre for International Governance Innovation.

Canada’s allies were not pleased at the refusal, Higginbotham said.

“That really put the cat among the pigeons.”

Russians were allowed into the U.S. to complete the talks after the Americans assumed the lead.

In most countries, coast guards are a branch of the military. That means the new forum will also provide a meeting place for high-ranking military officials from member countries, say experts.

“The most important consequence of the meeting will be that from now on there will be regular contact, regular meetings and exercises between the coast guards of all eight Arctic countries, and most importantly between Russia and Arctic NATO countries,” said Michael Byers, a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. “It’s very important that they’d be able to speak with each other to build confidence, to cooperate, especially given the tensions between Russia and NATO elsewhere in the world.”

Building on existing ties

Byers said there is a strong understanding in Washington and Moscow that the two countries need venues for diplomatic and security cooperation, and the Arctic where the two superpowers already cooperate is an ideal place to build this cooperative relationship.

“In December 2014, a South Korean trawler sank on the Russian side of the Bering Sea and the first thing the Russians did was to call the U.S. Coast Guard,” Byers said.

The Coast Guard Forum will exist in parallel with the 2011 treaty on Arctic search and rescue, negotiated through the Arctic Council. That treaty committed signatories to providing search and rescue in their sector of the North.

“This new forum will supplement existing cooperation, provide more regular contact between the leaderships of the different Arctic coast guards but it’s being built on top of already strong foundation,” Byers said.

One of the forum’s first actions will be to run a tabletop search and rescue simulation. That will establish communications protocols and determine who responds to what.

The head of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Paul Zukunft, has said an actual exercise could be mounted as early as next year.

The forum, although it will involve military personnel, will steer clear of security issues. That will follow the lead of other coast guard forums that already exist, such as those for the North Atlantic and North Pacific.

The forum is separate from the Arctic Council, the chief international diplomatic body on northern issues. However, its leadership will rotate in concert with the council, which is now led by the U.S.

With files from The Canadian Press

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Northern expert proposes new rule – Put up or shut up with your Arctic Conflict Theory, blog by Heather Exner-Pirot

Denmark:  Faroe Islands cashing in on Russian sanctions, Barents Observer

Finland: Finland and Russia talk Arctic in Oulu, Yle News

Norway:  Russian sanctions hit Norway hard, Barents Observer

Finland:  Russians no-show at Barents conference, Yle New

Russia:  The new Barents priorities, Barents Observer

Sweden:  Sweden’s dairy farmers hit hard by sanctions against Russia, Radio Sweden

United States: US pushes ambitious Arctic Council goals, Alaska Dispatch News

An annual intelligence assessment, which in large part focuses on Russia’s actions in the Arctic, released by Norway’s foreign intelligence service last week is drawing a lot of interest among defence and security experts in circumpolar countries, including Canada.

The report entitled Fokus 2016 was presented to the public on Feb. 24 by the head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) Lt. Gen. Morten Haga Lunde.

“Russia shows increased willingness and ability to use a wide range of instruments to achieve its political goals, and the modernization of its military powers enhances the ability to influence, also in the high north,” The Independent Barents Observer online news portal quoted from Fokus 2016.

Russia has re-established military infrastructure in the Russian Arctic over the last few years, reorganized and modernized its Arctic military units, increasing their capabilities with, new and modernized equipment, the NIS claims.

“From a Russian perspective the sum of these primarily defensive measures helps to create the necessary conditions for ensuring national control in Russia’s Arctic regions and protect the nation against threats from a northerly direction,” says the report. “It also increases Russia’s ability to restrict Norwegian and allied freedom of action in the North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.”

Lessons for Canada

The report’s focus on Russia is natural, given that both countries share a land border along the Kola Peninsula and a maritime boundary in the Barents Sea, said Prof Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia.

(click to listen to the full interview with Prof Michael Byers)

The most relevant point of the report for Canada’s Arctic policy was a statement made by Lt. Gen. Lunde in connection with the release of Fokus 2016, Byers said.

“Russia is no military threat to Norway today, but Russia has clearly displayed a willingness to use all the resources available to it in order to protect its interests inside Russia and abroad,” Lt. Gen. Lunde said in the statement.

“It’s not an alarmist report, it’s actually fairly cautious,” said Byers. “And this is a very important point for Canada: Russia is no military threat to Norway because in the Arctic Russia has been behaving itself.”

Canada geographic location, buffered from direct contact with Russia by Alaska on its western side, Greenland and the North Atlantic region on the eastern side, and the still frozen and inhospitable expanses of the Arctic Ocean to the north, make Russia even less of a threat to Canada than it is to Norway, Byers said.

“And Russia’s actions in the Arctic in terms of military activities have focused on building a few small bases for 100-150 men and increasing their capacity to do search and rescue and police the Northern Sea Route, a shipping route that passes along the northern coast of Russia,” Byers said. “This is not a massive military buildup and there is no sign of any inclination towards aggression in the Arctic.”

Far from that, Russia seems to have made the calculation that keeping the Arctic peaceful is in its interests because then it can devote more resources to places like Crimea or Syria, Byers said.

Dealing with Russia

Canada’s policy of dealing with Russia would require a careful balancing act between active, engaged diplomacy on one hand, and with further support for NATO to create a credible military deterrent on the other, Byers said. Even during the Cold War Canada spent a lot of time talking to the Soviet Union about issues of mutual interest, he said.

“In the Arctic, I think that Canada’s concerns are quite similar to Russia’s,” Byers said. “We need better search and rescue, we need to have better policing to deal with things like smugglers or illegal immigrants or potential threats to the environment. We need to cooperate with other countries including in the Arctic Council.”

Circumpolar countries also need to cooperate in terms of facing some of the scientific and technical challenges of operating in the north, he said.

“Canada is a very significant Arctic power, but Russia is the world’s largest country and 20 per cent of its GDP (gross domestic product) comes from its Arctic regions,” Byers said. “Russia does have things that it can teach Canada about how to operate in the north.”

Canada and Russia also have common interests in coming up with governing mechanisms for the central Arctic Ocean, the areas more than 200 nautical miles from shore, Byers said.

“There are issues concerning not just potential fisheries but also sea bed resources and environmental management that are very real and could only be solved in conjunction with Russia,” Byers said.

Resolving Arctic disputes with the U.S.

While a lot of attention is being focused on the hypothetical threats posed by Russia to Canada in the Arctic, Byers said he’d like Canada and U.S. to finally resolve their very real disputes in the north.

“I don’t see anyone asking whether the United States and Canada can resolve their dispute over the Northwest Passage,” Byers said. “I think it’s an obvious thing that needs to be done, a negotiation over the Northwest passage dispute in light of the fact that the climate change is reducing sea ice and is opening that waterway to all kinds of shipping.”

And there isn’t any significant movement on Canada’s dispute with the United States over the boundary in the Beaufort Sea, he said.

Back in 2010, then Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon initiated discussions with Washington on that issue but nothing seems to have happened over the past five years, Byers said.

Canada and its NATO allies shouldn’t read too much into reports that Russia plans to test the combat readiness of its nuclear deterrence force by firing a salvo of 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from a submerged submarine in Arctic waters, says a former high ranking Canadian soldier.

“Every country with military equipment that is complex needs to test it from time to time, so that in it of itself is not necessarily a big surprise,” said Lt. Gen. (Retired) Ken Pennie, former commander of Canada’s Air Force and ex-deputy commander of the North American Defence Command (NORAD). “These are going to be ongoing things, we cannot pay too much attention to them.”

(click to listen to an excerpt of the interview with Lt. Gen. (Ret) Ken Pennie)

The tests simply illustrate an existing military capability that will still be there whether Russia publicises it or not, he said.

Throwback to old glory days?

But Pennie said he doubts the accuracy of Russian media reports of the simultaneous launch of 16 missiles from a submerged submarine – a feat that has not been attempted in 25 years.

On Wednesday, the Russian newspaper Izvestia reported that two of Russia’s newest strategic nuclear submarines are ready to leave for the Barents Sea, where one of them is expected to attempt the highly complex and dangerous salvo launch. The Northern Fleet plans to repeat the Soviet military operation “Behemoth,” Izvestiya wrote.

The two Borey-class submarines “Yury Dolgoruky” and “Vladimir Monomakh” are ready to conduct the exercise, but only one of them will be launching all of its 16 Bulava (Mace) missiles in one salvo, the newspaper wrote.

The planned launch was not mentioned on official military websites, and news agency TASS wrote last week that the salvo would only consist of two missiles, not 16, reported The Independent Barents Observer.

“To test a whole boatload of missiles at one time is a fairly expensive undertaking,” Pennie said. “It’s more logical that they would test one or two missiles at the time, not all 16, but we’ll see what they do.”

‘More assertive and unpredictable’

The reports of the planned missile launch come just a week after the Norwegian Intelligence Service released its annual intelligence assessment where it warned that the West is likely to face a “more assertive and unpredictable” Russia in 2016.

“Russia, certainly President (Vladimir) Putin understands the role of force in terms of supporting his foreign policy,” Pennie said. “You see what he did in Crimea, you see what he did in Ukraine, and is still doing, and you see what’s he’s doing in Syria.”

These events are connected but that doesn’t mean that any particular test is necessarily directly tied to a particular foreign policy initiative, he said.

The same applies to Russia’s recent willingness to show off its military muscle by firing off cruise missiles from strategic bombers and Russian navy ships in the Caspian Sea to hit alleged ISIS targets 1,600 kilometres away in Syria.

“Russia has a military capability, they have foreign policy objectives and they want, especially Europe to understand that they have this capability,” Pennie said.

Canada is not a direct target of any of these activities, Pennie said. Russia is simply positioning itself as a world power, he said.

“Part of it is what some people call posturing,” Pennie said. “Basically, trying to put pressure on the international community to recognize that Russia has a voice and that voice ought to be heard.”

Implications for Canada

But even though Canada is not the primary target of this more assertive Russian policy, Canadian defence planners need to pay attention, especially because of the implications of Russian cruise missile capabilities for Canadian defence procurement policy, Pennie said.

Cruise missiles can be launched from sea or the can be dropped from bombers.

“NORAD pays a lot of attention to any missile threat but the one that comes from the bombers is linked in to the future fighter that we buy, because these cruise missiles are fairly advanced and they are hard to find, and they are manoeuvrable, and they are fast, and they can carry weapons of mass destruction,” Pennie said.

That means that the replacement for Canada’s CF-18 fighter jets will have to have the capabilities – the speed, the agility, the range, as well as communications, sensors and other electronic equipment – needed to find and hunt down cruise missiles.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Lessons from Norway’s Russia assessment, Radio Canada International

Denmark:  Nordics to step up security cooperation on perceived Russian threat, Yle News

Finland: Finland confirms 6th Russian airspace violation in just over a year, Yle News

Norway: Russia is more confident and unpredictable: Norwegian Intelligence Service, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia:  New Russian spy ship to keep tabs on Norway, Barents Observer

Sweden:  NATO agreement won’t bring nuclear weapons to Sweden, Radio Sweden

United States: U.S. general says Alaska military cuts not final without Arctic plan, Alaska Public Radio Network

Quietly flying under the news radar is an extremely important international meeting at the United Nations headquarters in New York City.

Delegates from several Arctic nations are presenting their positions in claims to the Arctic seabed at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Economic control of extensive regions of the Arctic seabed is a question involving potentially billions of dollars as it is thought there is vast mineral and oil and gas reserves to be discovered there.

The meetings began on February 15^th, and will continue until March 18^th.

New claims and evidence are being presented in which various claims such as Russia, Canada, and Denmark overlap.

Under the rules of UNCLOS, a nation can claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) over the continental shelf abutting its shores, and therefore the mining and mineral potential.

Russia for example is  extending its claims including the Lomonosov Ridge, Mendelyev Ridge, and Chuckchi plateau are all extensions of its continental shelf.  The Lomonosov claim would give Russia mining and oil/gas drilling under the North Pole would be under its control.

Denmark (Greenland) also makes claim to Lomonosov and other conflicting areas, while Canada, Denmark, and Russia have also contested portions of each other’s claims.

Even though vast sums of money are potentially at stake, the meetings are not expected to be contentious. Reported in the “Maritime Executive” the Russian minister for natural resources Sergei Donskoy said that he had discussions with Canada and Denmark about a their partially-revised Russian claim adding there were no objections. “Taking into account the quality of evidence supporting the claim and the past experience in working with the U.N. commission, we are expecting the decision to be positive,”

Additional information-sources

• Maritime Executive
• UNCLOS – Calendar of meetings
• Arctic Institute: Quick guide to UNCLOS-Arctic
• Globe and Mail-2015- Russia’s new claim
• Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region – Durham University 

As the Liberal government embarks on its long-promised defence policy review, it has to take a serious look at the threats and challenges to Canada’s security and sovereignty in the Arctic, says an expert on Arctic security.

Rob Huebert, associate professor with the Department of Political Science and research fellow with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at University of Calgary, said that to a very large degree the manner in which the Liberals approach the Arctic will basically illustrate what they are trying to get out of this particular defence review, Huebert said.

“Defence reviews can be asking basic questions on what Canadian security should be, they can be a political document justifying a country’s direction, and they can be a paper exercise,” Huebert said in a phone interview from Calgary. “So I think that if the government is indeed intent on asking what we need to give Canada the best security in the future, they are going to have to feature a predominant amount of effort on understanding the emerging security environment in the Arctic. It’s just that important to Canada.”

On the other hand, if the Liberals focus on demonstrating at all costs their difference from the previous Conservative government, then they will minimize the role of the Arctic in their defence review, Huebert said.

It will really come down to how serious the Liberals are about the issues facing Canada today, Huebert said.

Changes in strategic security environment

“The strategic security environment in which the Canadian Armed Forces operates has changed significantly,” Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said in a statement as he launched the defence review process in Ottawa on Wednesday. “I look forward to hearing from Canadians, from coast to coast to coast, as they help inform the development of a modern defence policy that will support the CAF to effectively respond to a full spectrum of challenges – now, and into the future.”

Srdjan Vucetic, associate professor at University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), said very little is known about the Liberal thinking on changes to the global security environment.

“You could argue that there has been a shift towards something like multi-polarity,” Vucetic said. “The so-called great power politics are back.”

Huebert said he expects some of that great power rivalry to spill over into the rapidly melting Arctic.

There is widespread acknowledgement that the entire Arctic region has changed in recent years, Huebert said.

“Climate change is the one that most people focus on, so the physical reality of the Arctic is changing, but more to the point, and I think this follows after what has happened in the Ukraine, is that people have realized that we do not have all of the community of nations that exist in the Arctic region, all basically on the same page,” Huebert said.

‘Arctic-powerful’ Russia

There is a growing realization that we are facing a much more “Arctic-powerful” Russia that does not necessarily share all of our security interests, he said.

“By the same token, I think there is a growing understanding that the Americans are becoming reengaged from a security perspective in the Arctic,” Huebert said. “And I dare to say the arrival of the Chinese naval task force in the Aleutian Islands last year and the visit of the Chinese naval vessels to some of the Nordic countries last year have also demonstrated that the Chinese from a strategic perspective are starting to become interested as well.”

The Arctic has become a much more complicated security environment involving the core strategic interests of some of the world’s most powerful countries, he said.

Despite this, there is a wide assumption among some analysts and decision makers that there is a normative good in the Arctic, that is somehow different from the rest of the world because its harsh environment forces circumpolar countries to pool resources and cooperate with each other, Huebert said.

“The problem with that is I think it really represents what we wish the Arctic was, rather than what it really has become,” Huebert said.

With few notable exceptions cooperation in the Arctic between circumpolar countries is nothing more than “cooperation about agreeing to cooperate,” Huebert said.

While acknowledging the success of the Arctic Council at some governance issues, the signing of the Coast Guard agreement, the cooperation on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Huebert said it doesn’t change the geopolitical realities of the increasing complex and accessible region.

‘Security imperatives’

“There are several key security imperatives that the Americans and the Russians face in the Arctic that we ignore at our peril,” Huebert said. “They haven’t come to the forefront yet and they haven’t become a major issue yet, but because they are so important to both Russia and the Unites States, and because they will come into competition with each other, this is where the problem is.”

For the Russians it’s all about their nuclear stability, the nuclear deterrent, Huebert said. Russia has been rebuilding its nuclear capability with great focus on their submarine-launched missiles that are primarily based in the Arctic region, the Northern Fleet, he said.

“As the Russians resume their position as a great power, as they try to rebuild their nuclear deterrent, which becomes their number one security policy…, they are going to take steps to defend it,” Huebert said. “That’s why we’re seeing the additional new bases going up in the Arctic.”

American concerns

On the other side of the coin, the Americans are becoming increasingly concerned about the North Korean missile threat, which as some point could be extended to the Chinese missile threat, Huebert said.

“If you take a look at where they have placed most of their mid-range interceptors, it’s in Alaska, because geographically that’s the best place to intercept missiles coming from that side of Asia,” Huebert said.

At the same time, the United States continue to send their attack subs into the Arctic region to demonstrate their ability to conduct naval operations in the region, even if under the guise of “scientific expeditions,” he said.

“You start putting all that together and then overlay growing competition in places such as Ukraine, Georgia, what the Russians call the ‘near abroad,’ the coming competition between the Americans and the Chinese and you can see the growing importance from a strategic perspective that the Arctic will have,” Huebert said. “And this is something, of course, if we are truly trying to look into the future of what to do, this is what we have to be examining.”

Surveillance capability

This new threat environment forces Canada to improve its surveillance and response of capabilities to maintain its sovereignty in the Arctic, Huebert said.

Ottawa has to take a hard look at what are some of the tools that Canada as an Arctic nation need in this environment to be able to adequately provide for the security of the region, Huebert said.

One such area is the continued funding for the continuance of the RadarSat system that gives Canada a very good surveillance capability in the Arctic, he said. Canada also needs to invest in ship identification systems, Arctic offshore patrol vessels and subsurface surveillance capabilities.

“We also have to be looking at our relationships with our northern allies,” Huebert said. “To that degree one of the major issues we will be facing, is how do we modernize NORAD.”

NORAD’s North Warning System was last given a major update in 1985, he said.

Ottawa also has to find a replacement for the ageing Canadian CF-18 fighter jets that provide the enforcement element of the North Warning System, a politically sensitive task for the Liberal government, which cancelled the F-35 program, Huebert said.

If Canada doesn’t come up with a timely replacement for the CF-18s, it might have to ask the United States to take over that role in protecting the northern flank of the North American continent, which would mean a significant surrender of Arctic sovereignty, Huebert said.

Increased NATO role in the Arctic?

Canada will also have to resolve its disagreement with Norway over Oslo’s desire to see increased NATO involvement in the Arctic, which the Harper government had opposed fearing erosion of sovereignty in the Arctic, given the stance of many European Union countries on the legal status of the Northwest Passage, which Canada considers internal waters, but the United States and several other countries see as international waters, Huebert said.

Another potential security and diplomatic dilemma for the Liberals is the possibility of Sweden and Finland, increasingly concerned with Russia’s assertive foreign policy and the militarization of the Arctic, asking to join the NATO.

“If that happens, it has all sorts of ramifications for Canada,” Huebert said. “If we say ‘no,’ it’s going to look as if we’re being intimidated by Russia. If we say ‘yes,’ I doubt that the existing multilateral cooperation that so many people are so justifiably proud of, such as the Arctic Council, how realistic is to expect that to continue.”

The most fundamental issue that gets very little public discussion is the lack of realization that the global security environment is once again becoming dangerous well beyond the much publicized threat of terrorism, Huebert said.

No friends, only interests?

“I think the other question too is this ongoing assumption that we can always count on the support and the assistance from our closest friends and allies,” Huebert said. “Within international relations there is the ongoing cliché that people have friends but countries only have interests. You watch some of the peculiar things happening in the United States right now from a political perspective and you go, ‘I don’t if you can necessarily count on this ongoing special relationship always ultimately protecting Canadian interests.”

For example a Trump presidency is very likely to question a lot of the assumptions in terms of the benefits the United States gets out of supporting its allies, Huebert said.

“Listen to some of the bizarre statements coming out of his mouth right now in terms of the relationship with some of the European countries …,” Huebert said. “Does that mean a greater isolationism in the U.S.?”

On the other side of the spectrum, Bernie Sanders also seems to espouse very isolationist views, he said.

“The landscape in the U.S. of isolationism versus multilateral engagement – and I stress multilateral, not unilateral engagement – is something that I think is starting to re-emerge,” Huebert said. “And it is something that will be very troubling for Canada because we’ve always known that an isolationist United States always creates a security dilemma for us, because we depend on the U.S. but if the U.S. is basically going to withdraw, how do we then manage our security relations.”

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Lessons from Norway’s Russia assessment, Eye on the Arctic

Denmark:  Nordics to step up security cooperation on perceived Russian threat, Yle News

Finland: Finland confirms 6th Russian airspace violation in just over a year, Yle News

Norway: Russia is more confident and unpredictable: Norwegian Intelligence Service, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia:  New Russian spy ship to keep tabs on Norway, Barents Observer

Sweden:  New security landscape in the Arctic, Radio Sweden

United States: U.S. general says Alaska military cuts not final without Arctic plan, Alaska Public Radio Network

Canada plans to submit its Arctic continental shelf claim in 2018 and it is expected to include the North Pole, overlapping with both Russian and Danish submissions that also claim ownership of the planet’s northernmost point, according to Canadian officials.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Canada ratified in 2003, all coastal states have a continental shelf extending 200 nautical miles (370 km) from coastal baselines. They can also extend their claim by 150 nautical miles (278 km) beyond 200 nautical miles if the shelf is a natural prolongation of their landmass.

However, there are circumstances where a coastal state can claim even further than 350 nautical miles, said Mary-Lynn Dickson, head of Canada’s UNCLOS Program.

“For instance in the case of submarine elevations, if a coastal state can prove that submarine elevation is part of its continental landmass, and if that feature extended beyond 350 nautical miles from their baselines, the coastal state could delineate an outer limit past 350 nautical miles,” Dickson said.

Canadian scientists claim that Lomonosov and Alpha-Mendeleyev Ridgesm, underwater mountain ranges stretching under the Arctic Ocean from Canada to Russia, are submarine elevations, thus giving them the right to claim the seabed under the North Pole.

Denmark too has delineated their outer limits extending from Greenland, across the Arctic Ocean, to the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation, Dickson said.

“We have collected data and we will develop it as best as we can to make scientific case, and we expect that we will overlap with Denmark and Russia,” she said.

“Canada is currently preparing an Arctic submission that is based on science,” said in an email John Babcock, a spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada. “The collection and analysis of scientific data to support the submission is ongoing, with a final survey to be undertaken later this summer, in collaboration with Sweden and Denmark.”

Research in harsh environment

Dickson said Canadian scientists in collaboration with their colleagues from circumpolar countries have been working on gathering scientific data to back up Canada’s extended continental shelf claim since 2006.

“It’s a very harsh environment,” Dickson said. “The amount of time that we can go up north, in the High Arctic to do our work is very limited – six to eight weeks in the summer.”

And because it’s such a challenging environment scientists have to use various methods to collect data, she said.

“We’ve set up ice camps on the ice up north,” Dickson said. “We’ve also used icebreakers to collect data; and when you use icebreakers you need two icebreakers. You need one icebreaker breaking ice in front of the ship that’s collecting the data, because we’re going through ice that’s meters thick, two-three meters thick.”

North Pole fever

In 2009, Norway became the first country to get its Arctic territorial claims approved, while Denmark/Greenland submitted a claim in December 2014.

In 2013, Canada submitted a partial claim for the continental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean. Canada’s then foreign affairs minister John Baird raised eyebrows when, during a news conference, he said the country’s scientists and been asked to do further work mapping the continental shelf so it included the North Pole.

Allegations that the request came from then Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper, after scientists concluded Canada’s continental shelf ended south of the pole, were not disputed at the time.

The United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS and cannot make a claim unless they do so.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Canada to collect more data for continental shelf claim, Eye on the Arctic

Canada: The Continental Shelf – Geological, legal or geopolitical?, Blog by Mia Bennett

Denmark: Denmark claims North Pole, Barents Observer

Iceland:  Revisualizing the Cryosphere, Blog by Mia Bennett

Russia:  UN to consider Russia’s Arctic continental shelf claim this summer, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden:  Swedish ships mapped at bottom of sea, Radio Sweden

United States:  U.S. to collect Arctic data for modern navigational charts, Alaska Dispatch News

The appointment of Chrystia Freeland, a fierce critic of the Kremlin and its actions in Ukraine, as Canada’s new minister of foreign affairs could put Canadian-Russian relations and the two countries’ collaboration in the Arctic back into deep freeze, argue some experts.

Paul Robinson, professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and an expert on Russia, said Freeland’s appointment doesn’t augur well for the course to improve Canada’s relations with Russia taken by her predecessor, Stephane Dion.

Dion had sought to reverse the policy of the previous Conservative government of Prime Minister Harper who cut almost all political contacts with Moscow following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine.

“Freeland is on record as demanding a very hard line against Russia and has made a lot of very negative comments about the Russian government and President Vladimir Putin,” said Robinson, a former British intelligence officer. “And of course she’s on Russia’s sanctions list, so we have a foreign minister who is actually prohibited from travelling to Russia, which is I think must be something of a first in international relations.”

Love of the Russian language but not the Kremlin

Freeland, who is of Ukrainian origin on her mother’s side and calls herself a Ukrainian-Canadian activist, is among 13 Canadian blacklisted politicians banned from travelling to Russia since 2014.

When asked whether her activism in Ukraine and her criticism of President Putin could be a hindrance in bilateral relations, Freeland, who speaks fluent Russian and Ukrainian, responded that her knowledge of Russia and the region will be a big asset.

“I know Russia well, lived in Moscow for four years and really, really enjoyed it and I have a really deep love for the Russian language and Russian culture,” Freeland told reporters in Ottawa on Tuesday. “And I’m a very strong supporter of our government’s view that it is important to engage with all countries.”

Robinson said Freeland’s love of the Russian language and culture is not particularly meaningful in a political context.​

“You don’t, as foreign minister, deal with abstract Russia, whose culture you happen to like, you deal with a state and her attitudes towards the Russian state are very negative,” Robinson said.

‘Chill right to the heart of the Kremlin’

Moscow hopes that the new Canadian cabinet will “follow its stated intention to further re-engage with Russia in areas of common interest,” said Kirill Kalinin, spokesman for the Russian Embassy in Canada, in an emailed statement. “We are open to develop bilateral relations on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocity.”

Freeland, who previously served as minister of international trade, landed one of the most prestigious and difficult portfolios on Tuesday, after a cabinet shuffle left Dion, a brilliant academic and a veteran Liberal MP, out in the cold.

“The main initiative put forward by Mr. Dion as foreign minister was to pursue increased cooperation with Russia in the Arctic,” said Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia.  “And it seems unlikely that Ms. Freeland will continue that policy given her very strong and very public opposition to Russian activities in Ukraine.”

Freeland, a former journalist who has written extensively on Russia, has been the most forceful opponent of Moscow in the prime minister’s caucus, Byers said.

“To appoint her as foreign minister certainly will send a chill right to the heart of the Kremlin,” Byers said.

Change in direction of Canadian foreign policy

Still, Byers argues that the very nature of international relations and challenges presented by the Arctic to all of the circumpolar states, could force Freeland to treat Russian actions in Ukraine and the need for cooperation in the Arctic as different issues that require different approaches.

“In our interdependent world countries always distinguish between issues and find way to cooperate on necessary items of cooperation, while disagreeing on other items,” Byers said. “For instance, Canada and China have an extremely important economic relationship while disagreeing significantly on issues of democracy and human rights.”

Canada and the U.S. have a very deep, long-standing disagreement over the status of the Northwest Passage but that doesn’t stop the two countries from cooperating in the common defence of North America, Byers said.

Freeland will necessarily have to have contact with Russia, he said.

“The issue is whether there will be progress in increasing cooperation and that certainly will be more difficult given Ms. Freeland’s very public personal views regarding Russian actions in Ukraine,” Byers said. “It’s not impossible but will be more difficult, so I see a certain change in the direction of Canadian foreign policy.”

Clear-eyed analysis

Rob Huebert, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary and a senior research fellow with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, said Freeland’s knowledge of Russia and her ability to analyse Russians is much more important in understanding her position vis-à-vis the Kremlin than her Ukrainian heritage and opposition to Russian actions in Ukraine.

“I think she has identified a very clear, growing security threat to Canada,” Huebert said. “Here’s an individual that, I think very much in opposition to what we can say Dion’s position was, understands that the Russia of today is not the Russia of the 1990s.”

Freeland has a much more realistic appraisal of modern-day Russia than Dion, Huebert said.

“We’re seeing a Russia that’s becoming much more assertive, much more willing to use military force to change boundaries and centralization within Russia, the crushing of the opposition, it’s a very different Russia than what it was in the 1990s,” Huebert said.

While cooperating with Russia where it serves Canada’s national interests, Freeland is much less likely to follow the idea that the Arctic is somehow different from the rest of the world, Huebert said.

“I’m hoping that what we’ll see with Freeland is of course the recognition that there are some areas that we can cooperate and we should cooperate,” Huebert said. “But by the same token, it’s still coming from a regime that we have to be very-very careful about how we treat.”

Freeland will probably be much more willing to accept the significance of the re-militarization of the Russian Arctic undertaken by the Kremlin in recent years, Huebert said.

The Kremlin denies any aggressive intent in its policy of building up its military capabilities in the Arctic. Moscow says it is simply restoring military capability and outposts in the Russian Arctic it was forced to abandon because of the economic collapse caused by the transition from Soviet planned economy to market economy in the 1990s.

Dealing with an Arctic hegemon

While Moscow doesn’t seek a military confrontation in the Arctic, geopolitically Russia has the ability to become a regional hegemon in the circumpolar world, Huebert said.

“The problem is when you have an increasingly aggressive and assertive regime who’s willing to use military force elsewhere but they have a regional hegemonic control, you get a spillover effect that becomes unpredictable until it occurs,” Huebert said.

That hegemonic power would give Russian authorities the ability to respond in the Arctic, where their military resources outmatch those of their neighbours, to challenges to their interests elsewhere in the world, Huebert said.

“Go ask the Finns, the Swedes and the Norwegians,” Huebert said. “Every single time that either something about the Baltics, or Syria, or any of those other regions start causing differences between the West and Russia what do the start doing now? And of course the answer is they start the overflights, they start the maritime incursions, they start the clear military violations of all the Nordic counties’ air and maritime spaces.”

Russia’s Ambassador to Canada Alexander Darchiev was not available for interview, but Russian officials insist that the country’s buildup of its military is in direct response to NATO’s continued expansion along Russia’s western and southwestern flanks, which started long before the Ukrainian crisis.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Canada stresses diplomacy and cooperation at Ottawa Arctic conference, Eye on the Arctic

Denmark:  Nordics to step up security cooperation on perceived Russian threat, Yle News

Norway:  Arctic Council aims to boost business, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia:  Russia invites Arctic Council on icebreaker tour, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden:   Sweden launches UN Security Council presidency with a New Year’s resolution, Radio Sweden

United States: Arctic Council – 20 years in a warming world, Deutsche Welle’s Iceblogger

A U.S. Arctic strategy document made public this week is putting both Moscow and Ottawa on notice that Washington considers the Arctic a vital if somewhat neglected area of national security interests and intends to vigorously defend them.

“This strategy, which is the culmination of years of bipartisan effort, represents an important and necessary step forward in defining our national security interests in the Arctic and finally addressing the capabilities that the United States will need to defend them,” Senator Angus King said in a statement.

“We are an Arctic nation and with this important strategy, we are starting to act like one,” added Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska.

The Department of Defense’s (DoD) Arctic Strategy specifically details “the ways and means DoD intends to achieve its objectives.”

‘Friction points’ with Canada and Russia

These include enhancing the capability of U.S. forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty; strengthening deterrence at home and abroad; strengthening alliances and partnerships; preserving freedom of the seas in the Arctic; and evolving DoD Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions, the document says.

While the report notes that “the Arctic generally remains an area of cooperation,” it also underlines two “friction points.”

The report identifies the dual disputes the U.S. has with Ottawa over the status of the Northwest Passage and with Moscow over the Northern Sea Route, along Russia’s Arctic coastline from the Bering Strait to Kara Sea, as the two sources of tension in the Arctic.

“The most significant disagreements from the United States’ perspective are the way that Canada and Russia regulate navigation in Arctic waters claimed under their jurisdiction,” said the unclassified version of the report, which was released internally in December, almost a month before the Trump administration assumed power.

Asserting freedom of navigation?

The strategy document calls on the U.S. to conduct “Freedom of Navigation operations to challenge excessive maritime claims when and where necessary” – a direct reference to Canada’s claims to the Northwest Passage and Russia’s claims to the Northern Sea Route.

The DoD Arctic Strategy was also discussed during the meeting on Monday in Washington between Canada’s Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, said in an email  Jordan Owens, Sajjan’s spokesperson.

Global Affairs Canada is sticking to its longstanding position on the status of the Northwest Passage.

“All waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, including the various waterways commonly referred to as the ‘Northwest Passage,’ are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title,” said John Babcock, a spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada.

The U.S. Arctic Strategy has major ramifications for Canada and Russia, said Rob Huebert, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary and a senior research fellow with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.

“It raises the very real possibility that they are going to start considering some form of freedom of navigation program,” Huebert said in a phone interview. “And freedom navigation programs are basically to challenge those countries that they think are improperly using navigational rights. And so does this mean that an American Trump administration is going to say: ‘OK, this is against American interests and therefore we’re going to push both the Russians and the Canadians on this issue.’”

Preventing diplomatic standoff

The Trump administration that doesn’t have any long-term ties or standing relationships with Canada seems quite capable of pushing Canada on the status of the Northwest Passage, Huebert said.

“If in fact this starts being American policy in light of what Trump has been doing and saying in terms of his policies for interactions with other states, I think it means that we may be facing a rockier problem than what most Canadians thought we would from the Americans,” Huebert said.

To prevent this potentially destabilizing event from taking place, Canadian diplomatic officials need to remind U.S. officials that by insisting that the Northwest Passage is an international strait, they would be opening it up to Russians and Chinese as well, Huebert said.

“It means the opening up North America’s northern flank,” Huebert said.

Longstanding U.S. policy

However, Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia, said for now he doesn’t see reasons to worry too much.

“What you’re seeing in this document is continuation of 50 years of U.S. policy, which has not included challenging the Russian claims in the Northern Sea Route and challenging Canadian claims on only two occasions in 1969 and 1985,” Byers said. “I don’t see that this document is raising the stakes in any way.”

In fact since 1988, thanks to Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan, Canada and the U.S. have an agreement with regards to U.S. Coast Guard voyages through the Northwest Passage whereby the U.S. agrees to provide notice that they would like to conduct a voyage and Canada agrees in advance to give permission and cooperation for any such voyage, Byers said.

“That’s a situation that is very carefully and successfully managed between the two countries and I don’t see any change in that situation,” Byers said.

Obama administration document

The strategy document bears the marks of the Obama administration, Byers said.

“This is essentially the final Arctic policy statement of the Obama administration,” Byers said in a phone interview. “It contains conclusions that are informed and quite reasonable.”

The document reflects the fact that the U.S. DoD understands the reality, scope and speed of climate change in the Arctic and has incorporated climate change in all of its planning, Byers said.

Many indications point to the fact that the DoD document was intended less as a strategy document and more as an internal document looking at the U.S. strength and weaknesses in the Arctic, Huebert said.

As such it offers an insight into how Washington sees the region and its role in it, Huebert said.

“Therefore I think the fact that they’re seeing that there is a bit of a problem with the Arctic being an ‘orphaned’ and not properly supported within the overall defence family in the U.S. means that, at the very least, Americans are aware that they don’t have their Arctic security file properly coordinated,” Huebert said.

In @SASCMajority hearing, I had opportunity to ask Gen. #Mattis about #SouthChinaSea, Russian #Arctic build-up, other challenges. #SECDEF pic.twitter.com/AuCJdP21kD

— SenDanSullivan (@SenDanSullivan) January 13, 2017

‘Informed and reasonable’

However, the report is informed and reasonable with regards to security threats in the Arctic, Byers said.

“It is not in any way alarmist about Russia or China,” Byers said.

The report makes a point with regards to the fact that while Russia has certainly been scaling up its military around the world, relatively very little attention is being paid to the Russian Arctic, Byers said.

“Russia is definitely a security concern in places like Eastern Europe and the Middle East but much less of a concern in the Arctic,” Byers said.

Byers said he was critical of the map of Russian military assets presented by Senator Sullivan, arguing the Department of Defense has produced a more objective assessment of the situation in the Russian Arctic.

“Yes, they are repairing Cold War infrastructure in some cases reopening former bases,” Byers said. “But those bases relatively speaking are quite small, that infrastructure relatively speaking is fairly minor.”

Policy enigma

Both Byers and Huebert agree that the problem for Canadian policy makers is that they have no idea yet where the new Trump administration stands on many of these issues.

The Arctic Strategy document offers very little guidance on this, Byers said.

“It tells us what the U.S. Department of Defense thinks but it tells us nothing about what the White House thinks under President Trump,” Byers said.

It seems the new Trump administration is not interested in continuing Obama policies on climate change and pursuing multilateralism based on international institutions such as the Arctic Council as cornerstones of their Arctic policy, Byers said.

Silver lining

“On the positive side, in terms of the Arctic at least, it seems likely that there will be a better relationship between the United States and Russia, perhaps most notably because of the appointment of Rex Tillerson as U.S. Secretary of State,” Byers said.

Tillerson has very strong connections to the Putin government due to his involvement as head of Exxon in Russian Arctic offshore oil projects, he said.

“One can predict that tensions with Russia in the Arctic to the degree that they existed in the Arctic are unlikely to increase,” Byers said. “That’s about all we can say at the moment.”

Time to resolve Beaufort Sea dispute

Also, little is expected to change in the near future with regards to Canada’s other Arctic dispute with the U.S. over the maritime border in the Beaufort Sea, Byers said.

“The dispute in the Beaufort Sea has always been an agreement to disagree,” Byers said. “There has been no tension whatsoever with regards to that dispute.”

Babcock said Canada favours a resolution of the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea.

“This dispute is well managed by Canada and the U.S. and will be peacefully resolved in accordance with international law when both parties are ready to do so,” Babcock said in an email. “Canadian and U.S. experts are engaged in a technical dialogue on the maritime boundary and on the extended continental shelf. Experts continue to be in regular contact.”

The dispute could possibly flare up again in the future if oil prices were to jump significantly, reigniting interest in extracting offshore oil reserves off North America’s Arctic coast. But as long as oil prices remain depressed, drilling in the Beaufort Sea makes little economic sense, even if the Trump administration were to succeed in overturning President Obama’s parting executive order banning all exploration and extraction activities off Alaska’s coastline, Byers said.

In fact, now is the best time to negotiate a solution for the dispute over the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea, Byers said.

“One can argue that the best time to negotiate a maritime boundary dispute is when there is no significant interest in oil and gas or fisheries in the area, in other words, to resolve the dispute while the stakes are low” Byers said. “But the history of maritime boundary disputes around the world suggests that countries really only engage diplomatically when there is some kind of tension.”

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Canadian military trains to respond to Arctic earthquake, Radio Canada International

Finland:  Finnish Air force to take part in joint Finnish-Swedish-US military exercises, Yle News

Norway:  Norway patrolling Russia’s military activity in Arctic with new intelligence vessel, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia:  Paratrooper exercises over Arctic Russia, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden:  New security landscape in the Arctic, Radio Sweden

United States: U.S. general says Alaska military cuts not final without Arctic plan, Alaska Public Radio Network

Following the recent announcement that Canada is extending its military’s mission to train the Ukrainian army by another two years, experts are watching whether the Kremlin will signal its displeasure with Ottawa with more than just diplomatic protests.

One of the ways the Russian government has done this in other regions – whether in the Baltics or the Sea of Japan – is by using its air force, particularly by conducting air patrols by Russian long-range strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

However, in the North American Arctic Russia has so far refrained from using the kind of aggressive tactics its air force has used in the skies over the Baltics or in the Sea of Japan, said Frédéric Lasserre, professor of geography at the Université Laval in Québec City, Canada, and the director of the Quebec Council of Geopolitical Studies, whose research focuses on geopolitics of the Arctic region.

Lasserre says while there remains a possibility of tensions between Moscow and Ottawa over Ukraine to eventually spill over to the Arctic, so far the Kremlin has shown little interest in escalating military tensions in the North American Arctic.

“I don’t see what would be the interest for Russia to shift the tension from the European Arctic and the Baltics to the Central Arctic basin and the North American Arctic,” Lasserre said.

Arctic escalation?

While Russia’s buildup of military resources on its own Arctic territory has many analysts and policy makers guessing what’s behind the recent flare up of activity in the Russian North, the Kremlin’s moves are largely defensive in nature and do not threaten the North American security, Lasserre argued.

“My hypothesis is that it’s two-fold,” Lasserre said. “First it’s a political gesture to underline the fact that its position has to be taken into account. So in the frame of the dispute between NATO and Russia because of the Ukrainian crisis, it’s another way to underline that Russia still is a powerful country, especially, in the Arctic, but it doesn’t mean that Russia intends to spill the conflict into the Arctic region.”

The second reason is that the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for the Russian economy, Lasserre said.

“More and more of the natural resources that Russia extracts and that fuel the budget of Russia come from the Russian Arctic and Siberia,” Lasserre said. “So in a way to try to protect these resources it’s also stepping up military assets deployed in the Arctic.”

Aggressive tactics

Lasserre says Russian behaviour in other regions of the world is a far more problematic.

In the Baltics, for example, not only is the number of patrols much higher than in the North American Arctic but these patrols also try to evade detection by turning off on-board transponders or flying at very low altitudes and sometimes these aircraft “illuminate” or “paint” their potential targets with their firing radars, Lasserre said.

“The behavior of these patrols is much more aggressive than it is with bomber patrols in the Arctic,” Lasserre said. “There are major differences between these regions: the Arctic, the Sea of Japan, Southern Europe or the Baltics. The Russian air force is much more aggressive in other areas and the place where it is the least aggressive is the Arctic for that matter.”

The difference in the Russian behaviour in these different regions can be explained by various reasons, said Lasserre.

In the Sea of Japan, Russia has a long-running territorial dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands that the Soviet Union occupied in the dying days of WWII.

“It’s a way for Russia to put pressure on Japan and it’s a constant behaviour that has been noticed in the past several years,” said Lasserre.

Crimean spillover

The sharp uptick of tensions in the Baltic region is a clear consequence of the Ukrainian crisis and the deterioration of relations between Russia and Western countries following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its continued involvement in supporting pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine, Lassere said.

“So it’s kind of spill-over of this tension through the behaviour of Russian military assets, including the air force,” Lasserre said. “Russia is trying to show its displeasure through much more aggressive patrols towards the space of Scandinavian or Baltic countries.”

Just training or sending a message?

Russia resumed its strategic bomber patrols in the North American Arctic back in 2007, said Lasserre.

The resumption of these patrols in the North American Arctic can be explained by several factors, said Lasserre.

“It was surprising that Russia stopped these patrols in the first place,” Lasserre said in a phone interview. Armies around the world routinely practice just to keep operational capacity, he said.

“So it was kind of normal from a military point of view that Russia resume practising long-range flights,” said Lasserre. “These are directed not only on the North American Arctic but they are also directed at the Pacific and Europe. From that point of view North America is not a particular target for long-distance bomber patrols.”

The other reason that Russia resumed its air patrols is because it wanted to be taken seriously, he said.

“There was a feeling in Russia that it was hard to digest the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reduction in the political influence in the world during this political upheaval,” Lasserre said. “And so Russia does intend to signal to its Arctic partners that its voice has to be taken into account, so it’s kind of a political gesture to underline the fact that Russia is still an important political power in the Arctic.”

The third factor behind the resumption of Russian air patrols is domestic politics, he said. It was important for the Russian government to placate the hawks among the political circles in Russia that pushed for the resumption of military spending and a more aggressive posture in Russian foreign policy, Lasserre said.

In addition there was the factor that NATO never stopped its own air patrols along Russian borders, Lasserre said.

“NATO and other powers in the vicinity of Russia never stopped practising long-range fighter or bomber patrols because it’s normal practice for most militaries in the world to probe their neighbour’s capacity of response and to practice an operational capacity,” Lasserre said.

Difference in attitudes

However, there is a crucial difference in attitudes, Lasserre said.

“It’s different if practice is commonly admitted, if there are warnings ahead of manoeuvres, which was common practice for Russia,” Lasserre said. “Whereas, if you do begin to hide those practices, if you fly at low altitudes, if you try to evade detection, then the attitude will be perceived as more aggressive.”

In the past, the Russian government has issued warnings to NORAD officials about its patrols a long time ahead of the flights, Lasserre said.

“So the Canadian and American authorities were aware of the fact that the patrols would come,” Lasserre said. “Second, these bombers usually flew at high altitudes; that means that they did not try to evade detection.”

No breaches of Canadian sovereignty

And despite the impression one might get by reading some of the headlines in the news, these Russian air patrols never tried to enter the Canadian air space, he said.

While it’s true the Russian bombers routinely enter NORAD’s Air Defence Identification Zone, which extends far beyond the 12-mile sovereign air space of Canada along its coastlines but is not recognized in international law, there are no reports that Russian aircraft ever entered Canada’s sovereign air space, Lasserre said.

“They always turn back before they present a real threat to the integrity of the air space,” Lasserre said. “For all those reasons it’s difficult to see that those patrols are presenting an actual threat to the North American security.”

The Conservative government of former Prime Minister Stephen Harper seized on the resumption of Russian patrols to use them for domestic political reasons but was never able to explain how these patrols, which happened in international airspace threatened Canadian security or sovereignty in the Arctic, Lasserre said.

Old bomber, new missiles

Rob Huebert, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary and a senior research fellow with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, says Lasserre’s analysis is missing an important point.

“The problem, of course, is that it misses a proper geopolitical understanding and strategic understanding of the whole purpose of these long range bomber patrols,” Huebert said. “It’s not so much that they’re coming in, it’s what they carry.”

While the Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers, nicknamed Bears by NATO, were built in the 1960s, the modern cruise missiles they carry inside increasingly have longer and longer range and lethality, Huebert said.

Russia’s use of cruise missiles in the Syrian conflict showed that these missiles have a range of at least 1,500 kilometres, which means that the Russian aircraft don’t need to breach sovereign Canadian airspace to present a possible threat to the country’s security, Huebert said.

“So it’s not just that they are coming up to our airspace and everything is OK because they don’t commit violations, it’s the mere fact that they have increased the number of flights, they have increased the complexity,” Huebert said. “And for the first time ever they started attaching fighter escorts to these patrols.”

All that leaves a lot of room for concern for Canadian Arctic security, Huebert said.

“It may not be technically a violation of Arctic sovereignty but it’s a challenge to Arctic security,” Huebert said.

Changing political context

Lasserre’s analysis is also off the mark by not taking into account the current political context, Huebert said.

“Of course the major context is the effort of the Putin administration to increase its military capability, particularly, after the 2014 intervention in the Ukraine,” Huebert said. “We see relationships deteriorating and we see from what we can ascertain in terms of what information is available that there has been an increase in these overflights.”

Russia is using these patrols not only as a means to signal to Canada and its Western allies the Kremlin’s displeasure with Western policies but also to flex its muscles and put pressure on the West, Huebert said.

Declining military and industrial capacity

Still Lasserre is sceptical about Russia’s long-term capacity to compete with the West militarily.

“For financial reasons and because of the decline in the productive capability the Russian army is still set for steady decline, especially in its naval and air force capacity,” Lasserre said. “Even if Russia decided to put billions of dollars now in the military, the trend would be towards the reduction of the Russian navy and the Russian air force, because of so many assets that are too old and are going to be withdrawn from the order of battle.”

In the short and medium term the Russian military might is set to decline, unless Moscow makes enormous investments not only in its military industrial complex, but also in research and development, and fundamental sciences, which have been woefully underfunded since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than 25 years ago, Lasserre said.

“It’s not because you open new bases in the Arctic that you have the possibility to strike Washington or New York or whatever, it depends also on the assets you can deploy in these new bases,” Lasserre said. “It’s the same for the navy. Yes, Russia is trying – at least in its discourse – to be a new force that has to be taken into account from the naval point of view as well, but if you look at the figures, it’s obvious that the number of units in the Russian Northern Fleet is still going to decline.”

Most of the investments are going towards nuclear submarines, an increasingly important part of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence, and to green water naval vessels – warships designed to protect Russia’s extensive coastline, not to project Russian power in the so-called blue water far beyond Russian shores, said Lasserre.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Freeze or thaw? What Freeland’s appointment means for Russia-Canada relations in the Arctic, Eye on the Arctic

Finland:  Finnish Air force to take part in joint Finnish-Swedish-US military exercises, Yle News

Norway:  Norway patrolling Russia’s military activity in Arctic with new intelligence vessel, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia:  Paratrooper exercises over Arctic Russia, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden:  New security landscape in the Arctic, Radio Sweden

United States: U.S. Arctic strategy puts Canada and Russia on notice, Eye on the Arctic

Despite blasting Russia for its “illegal annexation of Crimea” and “its willingness to test the international security environment,” search and rescue and surveillance, not warfighting are the main thrusts of Canada’s newly released defence priorities in the Arctic, experts say.

The defence policy released by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan on June 7 calls on the government to increase Canada’s annual military spending by 70 per cent to $32.7 billion over the next decade.

The ambitious new policy called Strong, Secure, Engaged set out plans to increase the size of Canada’s regular and reserve forces, invest in better care for soldiers and veterans, buy a new fleet of 88 fighter jets and 15 new navy warships, as well as invest in high-tech drones, cyber warfare, space and intelligence capabilities.

The announcement comes on the heels of Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland’s address to Parliament on June 6, where she laid out the case for increased investment in Canada’s “hard power.”

Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia, said he was struck by the continuity of policy from not only the last year and a half of Trudeau government but also under Stephen Harper’s Conservative government.

“The policy on the Arctic continues to be one of regarding the region as a peaceful region where cooperation between allies is the appropriate response and where investments in the military are relatively moderate and focused on search and rescue and surveillance,” Byers said.

Search and rescue and surveillance are the primary military concerns in the Arctic, Byers said.

“We’re not seeing a big investment in warfighting capability because there is no serious state to state threat in or around Canada’s Arctic,” Byers said. “So I think this is a wise approach to focus on the more peaceful dimension of military operations in the North.”

Investment in space capability

The most significant element of the defence policy review relating to Canada’s Arctic capabilities concerned investments in satellite technology, Byers said.

“The government has reaffirmed its commitment to a new generation of synthetic aperture radar satellites, RADARSAT constellation, which is a technology for surveillance that enables the operators, in this case the Canadian Forces to see through clouds at night to track vessels on the ocean,” Byers said. “It’s a very powerful technology developed in Canada and the government remains committed to that.”

In addition, the government made a multi-billion commitment to putting new satellites into a polar orbit to provide high bandwidth communications ability for Canadian Forces in northern operations, he said.

“Clearly, at the level of surveillance this government is prepared to pay what is necessary to keep our eyes and ears open in the Canadian Arctic,” Byers said.

No new military bases in the Arctic

The Liberals also renewed their commitment to the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) program and the refueling station at Nanisivik refueling station for the Navy on Baffin Island in Nunavut, Byers said.

The Army too will get some new equipment and more training to allow it to continue Arctic operations, Byers said.

“We’re not seeing a major buildup, we’re not going to see new military bases in the Arctic,” Byers said. “It’s pretty much a continuation of what we had before under Stephen Harper and the last year and a half under Mr. Trudeau.”

Complete turnaround and continuity

Rob Huebert, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary and a senior research fellow with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, said there has been a complete turnaround in the way the Liberals approach defence of the Arctic.

“I think what the document clearly shows is that the Arctic is not an afterthought, it’s not a sort of a boutique subject that often we saw in the past like, ‘Oh, yes we have to protect Arctic sovereignty. Next subject,’” Huebert said. “Whereas in this defence paper what was quite striking was that a lot of attention was given in terms of what we needed to do.”

For example, it’s clear that there is a commitment to renew the binational North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), Huebert said.

“The other part that I think was quite striking also in terms of the Arctic is that there wasn’t any scaling back of some of the initiatives that Harper had brought forward,” Huebert said.

Maturing political system

There had been some concern on the basis of some preceding statements that the Liberals had made that they were going to decrease the number of Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) and instead of building the 5 or 6 the Harper government had promised, that they were going to build maybe two or three, he said.

The defence policy paper made it clear that Liberals were going to build 5 or 6 AOPS.

The continuance of the improvement of the surveillance capability, particularly satellite capabilities, is another sign of maturing political system, Huebert said.

“We’re starting to see a bit of a bipartisan agreement in terms of the centrality and importance of the Arctic,” Huebert said. “That shows a certain maturity that I think is not always in all the things the government does.”

A sleight of hand?

Huebert said he would have liked to see more of the spending begin earlier, instead of being pushed to a later date after the next election.

“Just as the Conservatives had done beforehand, it’s a sleight of hand, saying, ‘Oh, we’re going to increase the budget, but we’re going to do it in a ten-year period,’” Huebert said. “Well, that would be fine if, of course, the term of office that they had was 10 years but it’s not. So I think that’s a bit dishonest.”

The trouble with Trump and Russia

Huebert said he was struck by how blunt Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland was in terms of identifying the international environment that Canada is now facing.

“She basically was quite blunt and quite forward talking about the challenges that are presented to Canada by both the actions of the Trump administration in the United States and the Putin administration in Russia,” Huebert said.

The Trump administration presents a completely new challenge to Canada, one that Ottawa hasn’t had to deal with since the beginning of WWII, Huebert said.

“One of the paradoxes of course is that as long as we weren’t too concerned about the Americans being off the overall focus of defence for the Western world, we could basically free-ride, and I think we did to a very large degree” Huebert said.

“I think now that the realization has sunk in that a) we don’t know where Trump is going, and b) I think there is a very real reason [not] to trust his commitment to the maintenance of Western security, it means that we got to start doing it ourselves.”

Continuation of Dion policy

While Freeland was very blunt about the threat posed by Russia in other regions of the world, she did not identify Moscow as a threat in the Canadian Arctic, Byers said.

“I think that is significant,” Byers said. “We know that Chrystia Freeland’s predecessor as foreign minister, Stephane Dion, made a real effort to promote Arctic cooperation, including with Russia.”

That Arctic engagement seems to be continuing under Freeland despite her quite strong views about Russia’s actions in places like the Ukraine, Byers said.

“We need to talk with Russia, we need to cooperate with Russia in the Arctic,” Byers said. “It’s a large and extreme region where we need to work with each other. It’s not a place that we can afford to militarize just because it’s so big, so remote and so incredibly expensive.”

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Canada’s new budget thin on Arctic policy substance: expert, Radio Canada International

Finland:  Finnish Air force to take part in joint Finnish-Swedish-US military exercises, Yle News

Norway:  Russia’s Northern Fleet takes on key role in search and rescue exercise with Norway, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia: Population growth in military towns of Kola Peninsula, Russia, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden: Sweden’s Prime Minister reaffirms commitment to country’s defense, Radio Sweden

United States: Here’s what’s in the U.S. Defense Department’s new Arctic strategy, Alaska Dispatch News

Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland was in Finland on Thursday to participate in an European Union high-level meeting focused on Arctic environmental challenges and sustainable development. But Freeland also used her trip to northern Europe to lobby for faster ratification of a key Canada-EU free trade deal.

The two-day event in Oulu, Finland’s largest northern city, is co-hosted by Finnish Foreign Affairs Minister Timo Soini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, and Commissioner Karmenu Vella responsible for the Arctic policy of the EU.

Okalik Eegeesiak, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, is also attending the meeting, which concludes on Friday. She will represent the international interests of Inuit in Canada, Greenland, Chukotka (Russia) and Alaska.

Meetings with top officials

Freeland held bilateral meetings with Soini and Mogherini, said Global Affairs spokesperson Austin Jean.

They discussed the importance of Canada-EU cooperation on various matters, including the ratification of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), working constructively with the U.S. on climate change, and Canada’s role as a key partner for European and international peace and security, Jean said.

“Canada and the EU have shared values and a commitment to people in the Arctic region,” Freeland said in a statement. “There are excellent opportunities to advance our common priorities, including action on climate change and support for Indigenous peoples, science, technology and innovation.”

Freeland’s interest in Arctic affairs is very encouraging, said Heather Exner-Pirot, the managing editor of the Arctic Yearbook, a Research Fellow with the EU Arctic Forum, and a member of the Board of Advisors for the Arctic Institute.

“Canada is probably going to release a new Arctic foreign policy in the fall,” Exner-Pirot said. “So, actually I’m very encouraged that she’s going to be pretty well-informed and have a good idea of the region and the politics before that comes out.”

The very high-level #EUarctic panel session. #Oulu pic.twitter.com/qfrxbcnUvT

— Finland Arctic (@FIArctic) 15 juin 2017

New focus on innovation

The event, titled “A sustainable Arctic – innovative approaches,” aims to boost the dialogue on the EU’s Arctic policy and development of the Arctic regions of the EU, organizers said.

Finland, which in May assumed the two-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council for 2017–2019, wants to draw special attention to the development of the Arctic regions of Europe, in part by making use of the EU’s financial instruments, Finnish foreign affairs officials said in a statement.

Participants of the event, which include government officials, industry, researchers, and Indigenous and local community representatives, discussed innovative and sustainable solutions for the development of the economy and infrastructure, while taking account of the Arctic environment and the perspectives of the indigenous peoples, people living in the region and the international community, organizers said.

During the EU Arctic policy event, Freeland gave a keynote address on science, innovation and cooperation as ways to address the challenges facing the Arctic, most notably, climate change, Jean said. She then participated in the panel discussion, “The Arctic is local and global – increasing expectations.”

The focus on innovation is a relatively recent and a very welcome addition to the agenda of the meeting in Oulu and in discussion about Arctic issues in general, Exner-Pirot said.

Collaboration on technological innovation, especially for infrastructure, materials for roads, food systems, broadband communications, water and waste treatment systems is especially important in the Arctic because it allows for economies of scale, Exner-Pirot said.

Free trade agenda

Freeland also used the opportunity to drum up support for CETA, which she led to successful conclusion in her previous capacity as Canada’s international trade minister.

Of 28 EU member states, so far only Latvia and Denmark have ratified the deal.

“Our partnership will grow with CETA, which will have significant benefits for citizens of both Canada and the EU,” Freeland said.

Freeland also had a meeting with her Norwegian counterpart Borge Brende to discuss “shared interests” and CETA.

Always pleased to have time to discuss + shared interests with Foreign Minister @borgebrende, incl #CETA and the #Arctic. #OsloForum pic.twitter.com/Jio9YQCyJc

— Chrystia Freeland (@cafreeland) 15 juin 2017

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Canada’s new budget thin on Arctic policy substance: expert, Radio Canada International

Finland: Arctic Council presents united front as Finland takes over from U.S., Eye on the Arctic

Greenland: Q&A: Impact assessments in the Arctic – What Canada and Greenland can learn from each other, Eye on the Arctic

Iceland: Norwegians and Icelanders let Alaskans in on the secrets to economic prosperity, Alaska Dispatch News

Norway: Norway and Finland talk Arctic with China, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia: Our future lays in the Arctic, says Putin in annual press conference, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden: Cities are population winners in northern Sweden, The Independent Barents Observer

United States: With Trump administration intentions unclear, Alaskans might have to fill the void on Arctic policy, Alaska Dispatch News

Canada’s long-awaited defence review came out earlier this summer, giving Arctic experts the chance to analyse the Trudeau government’s position on Arctic issues. And as expected, the review devoted a section to the role of the Canadian Forces (CF) in Canada’s Arctic.

These statements are important because we’re able to evaluate where there’s been continuity, or a break, with previous governments.

For example, to say that the 2017 defence review does not focus on human security (food security, housing, education and the like) would be misleading.  Traditionally, these priorities have been addressed in policy papers spearheaded by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (in 2009) or the Department of Foreign Affairs (in 2000).

Thankfully, national defence matters have enjoyed several official statements.

The Martin Liberal government published one in 2005 (A Role of Pride and Influence in the World) and the Harper Conservative government released one in 2008 (Canada First Defence Strategy).

But if there’s one thing we can take away from the three Canadian defence documents, it’s this: there’s certainly an Arctic bipartisan consensus in Canada on the strategic and geopolitical nature of the Arctic environment as well as the role of the Canadian Forces.     

Sovereignty and security: the surveillance and control consensus

The description of the Arctic region in the 2017 statement looks remarkably similar to the ones made in the 2005 and 2008 statements. The 2005 review warned that “the demands of sovereignty and security for the Government could become even more pressing as activity in the North continues to rise”.

The demands in the statement aren’t described as military ones initiated by other states, but rather the kinds of threats posed by drug smuggling, organized crime and environmental disasters, things requiring greater surveillance and control.

The focus on asymmetrical threats, the absence of military conflict and the need for greater control and surveillance in this year’s statement, were all highlighted in a recent analysis  by Adam Lajeunesse, the Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Arctic Marine Security at St. Francis Xavier University in the Atlantic Canadian province of Nova Scotia.

The Conservative government’s 2008 statement also made similar observations. No mention of conventional military conflict or state threats in the Arctic region was made.

Descriptions of the strategic environment are also similar: “Retreating ice cover has opened the way for increased shipping, tourism and resource exploration, and new transportation routes are being considered, including through the Northwest Passage”. In turn, these changes could “spark an increase of illegal activity” in the region.

The statement follows that the Canadian Forces must “detect threats to Canadian security as early as possible” and “have the capacity to exercise control over and defend Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic”. The surveillance and control component is front and center, mobilising most of the investments announced, including the acquisition of drones, radars and satellites.

The continuity is clear between the last defence review statement and previous ones. Even the rhetorical turn suggested by Adam Lajeunesse does not hold true; the “surveillance” term comes back more often in the 2005 and 2008 statements than the term “sovereignty”.

A look at all three documents shows that when it comes to the Arctic, surveillance (knowing what is going on) and control (acting upon the information gathered) are at the heart of bipartisan consensus in Canada.

These two components encompass sovereignty and security concerns: exercising our sovereignty means addressing and/or neutralizing public security threats like smuggling, environmental disasters and search-and-rescue missions.

This approach also lists threats shared with other states (especially allies) and reasserts the primacy of the Canadian state in the region. Fighting non-state threats will not cause friction with other states, especially more powerful ones.

This brings us to some of the ways the 2017 document did break with previous statements.

Open versus closed multilateralism

Rob Huebert argued that the most important change in the 2017 defence review was depicting Russia as an Arctic adversary.

While the allusion is more explicit that in any previous policy statement, it needs to be put into perspective.

First, the review is more adamant about presenting Russia as an adversary rather than specifically painting it as an Arctic adversary.

The distinction is important.

The passages highlighted by Huebert do not concern the Arctic region directly but are part of broader concerns, namely continental defence (largely driven by the United States) and multilateral dynamics (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

In regards to the latter point, the Canadian Arctic is of secondary concern since the threat is directed at the North Atlantic region: “NATO has also increased its attention to Russia’s ability to project force from its Arctic territory into the North Atlantic”.

Secondly, Huebert is correct when he points out that the NATO mention represents a game-changer.

The importance of the allusion is more profound for Arctic governance than for the ‘Russia-as-Arctic-adversary’ argument. The mention officialises the most meaningful break with the Harper government’s stance on Arctic issues to date.

In fact, the Harper government expressed a great unwillingness to incorporate non-Arctic states or entities in Arctic governance. The general approach, one rooted in limited or closed multilateralism, was to centre Arctic governance around Arctic states, and even around sub-groupings such as the Arctic Five meetings (United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway).

A turning point 

The Canadian government was reluctant to accept non-Arctic (but especially Asian) states as observers in the Arctic Council. It had a similar attitude towards the European Union when it wanted to play a bigger role in the region.

The mention of NATO in the 2017 statement represents a turning point as the Trudeau government does not shy away from integrating partners and non-Arctic states in Arctic decision-making.

The participation of Canada in the Arctic 5 + 5 meetings to discuss the future of fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean with countries like China, South Korea and the European Union constitute another example of such policy.

This open or inclusive multilateralism is a timely policy change as the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) is freed of ice.

The stewardship and respect of national jurisdiction heard so often in recent years from Arctic states, will not hold as the CAO is international waters. Open multilateralism will be necessary to manage this area as national sovereignty will no longer suffice.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Surveillance and search and rescue top Canada’s Arctic defence priorities, Radio Canada International

China: China’s Belt and Road initiative moves into Arctic, blog by Mia Bennett

Denmark/Greenland: Discussions underway on who can claim Arctic seabed, Radio Canada International

Finland: Russia, Finland leaders talk defence, environment and possible US sanctions, Yle News

Norway: Military exercise Arctic Challenge 2017 set for take off, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia: What Russia’s new Navy Strategy says about the Arctic, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden: Sweden’s Prime Minister reaffirms commitment to country’s defense, Radio Sweden

United States: Alaskans greet North Korean missile test with a shrug not a shriek, Alaska Public Media

Strategic concerns over the vulnerability of China’s current trade routes and climate change are pushing Beijing to pay growing attention to developing new transport infrastructure and shipping routes across the increasingly accessible Arctic, experts say.

In recent weeks China has made several headlines that illustrate Beijing’s growing interest in developing economic links, gaining scientific knowledge and expertise of operating in the Arctic.

The Chinese-state owned shipping giant COSCO has expressed strong interest in developing an Arctic deep-water port on the Northern Dvina River near the northern Russian city of Archangelsk and building a new railway to transport natural resources from the Siberian heartland to China and other world markets via the Arctic port, The Barents Observer has reported.

The Chinese icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon) is on its way home to Shanghai after completing its first circumnavigation of the Arctic where it travelled through both the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast and the Northwest Passage through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago in one shipping season.

21st century Silk Road

These seemingly unrelated events are a small part of a grandiose project called One Belt, One Road (OBOR), a $5 trillion plan to upgrade transport infrastructure between Asia and Europe being promoted by Beijing for the last four years, experts say.

Also referred to as the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, the strategy is the brainchild of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has championed the project during his meetings with world leaders and at international fora, most recently at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in Beijing in May.

The goal of the initiative, which would see China build a land-based and maritime transport web across the globe, “is to advance regional cooperation, strengthen communication between civilizations, safeguard world peace and stability, achieve common development, and pursue a better life,” said a statement by the Chinese embassy in Canada.

Peter Cai, Nonresident Fellow at Australia’s Lowy Institute, said that with its land-based Silk Road Economic Belt Beijing aims to connect the country’s underdeveloped hinterland to Europe through Central Asia.

“The second leg of Xi’s plan is to build a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road connecting the fast-growing Southeast Asian region to China’s southern provinces through ports and railways,” Cai wrote in an analysis paper in March.

Over sixty countries with a combined population of 4.4 billion and accounting for around 29 percent of global GDP participate in the initiative.

And now climate change and the rapid loss of sea ice in the Arctic is presenting Beijing with another alternative to “diversify its portfolio” of trade routes, said Frédéric Lasserre, professor of geography at the Université Laval in Québec City, Canada, and the director of the Quebec Council of Geopolitical Studies, whose research focuses on geopolitics of the Arctic region.

Strategic and geopolitical concerns

The OBOR strategy reflects Beijing’s preoccupation with its so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” Lasserre said in a phone interview with Radio Canada International.

The term refers the fact that a lion’s share of China’s trade goes through a few strategic chokepoints – chiefly the Malacca Strait between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, he said.

“The Chinese government worries that there might be some day a political incident or conflict with the United States that would mean its trade is blocked across these straits,” Lasserre said. “So as to reduce this geopolitical risk, one way is to develop other trade routes, either maritime or land-based, to diversify the trade routes it can use to either import natural resources or to export its products to final markets.”

The other reason China is developing these trade routes is both economic and political in nature, he said.

“China is trying to develop closer economic relationships with its neighbours so it’s investing in building infrastructures – rail infrastructures, port infrastructures – to foster trade with these neighbours and to develop closer ties that can be economic and political, trying to build a so-called sphere of influence by developing dependence from these countries on Chinese economic exports,” Lasserre said.

“The possibility to build these fixed links, railway links or port infrastructures helps the Chinese influence to grow in these countries. So it’s both economics: gaining access to new markets and political: gaining political influence in these countries.”

Arctic Silk Road?

China has invested billions of dollars to acquire access to key railway and port infrastructure around the world, from the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan, to facilities near the Panama Canal, to the purchase of a controlling stake in the Port of Piraeus – Greece’s largest port – by COSCO Shipping, owner of the world’s fourth largest container fleet, and the company that wants to develop the deep-water port on the Northern Dvina River near Archangelsk .

The same logic of trying to secure access to the Golden Route or the route across the Panama Canal applies to Chinese interest in the Arctic, Lasserre said.

“They also want to try and develop the Arctic route just in case it might be useful from a commercial point of view,” Lasserre said.

Prof. Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia, said the Arctic dimension of this ambitious strategy is relatively small for now.

“You have to look to Africa or Latin America to see the truly massive investments, hundreds of billions of dollars, in infrastructure and other forms of foreign investment,” Byers said in a phone interview with Radio Canada International.

Chinese investment in the Canadian Arctic

But while the Arctic is currently on the periphery of much of that investment, Byers said he expects Chinese involvement will grow if it maintains its vast stores of capital available for investment.

“Some of that will be related to newly opened shipping routes as a result of climate change – the Northern Sea Route, north of Russia, the Northwest Passage, north of Canada – and some of it will involve investments in resource industries,” Byers said. “Perhaps, in oil and gas in the Russian Arctic or the Canadian Arctic, probably in mining as well.”

Chinese companies already own a combined stake of 29.9 per cent in Russia’s $27 billion US Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project.

Last year, the Yamal project signed loan agreements with Chinese banks worth over $12 billion US, circumventing Western sanctions over the crisis in Ukraine.

There has already been some Chinese investment in northern Canada, particularly in the Chinese-owned Nunavik Nickel Mine near Deception Bay, in Nunavik, northern Quebec.

In 2014, the company shipped 23,000 tonnes of nickel concentrate extracted from the mine using one of the most powerful ice-breaking bulk carriers in the world.

The MV Nunavik transited through the Northwest Passage on its voyage from Deception Bay, Quebec to northeastern China.

Is China interested in Port of Churchill?

“The more interesting question is whether the Chinese government or Chinese state-owned companies will wish to invest in infrastructure in Canada’s Arctic as they’ve done in other countries around the world,” Byers said.

“And there is certainly a need for ports in Canada’s Arctic, there is a need for improved services such as search and rescue, and one could imagine all kinds of public-private partnerships involving Chinese capital and Canadian governments, whether federal or provincial or territorial.”

For example, the Port of Churchill in northern Manitoba, which has been closed because OmniTRAX, the U.S. company that owns it decided that it’s not economically viable, could be of potential interest for the Chinese, Byers said.

“It’s possible that a big Chinese company might take a different view and wish to invest the necessary funds in Churchill to make it operational again and to develop Churchill as an artery for trade into the American Midwest from the Canadian Arctic,” Byers said.

A welcome investment?

If done in partnership with federal, provincial or territorial governments, this kind of Chinese investment in infrastructure will be welcomed in Canada, Byers said.

“I’m worried about other dimensions of Chinese investment particularly in sensitive military technologies – and there has been a record of lack of concern by the current federal government in some key investments in that area,” Byers said, referring to the recent take-over by a Chinese company of Vancouver-based Norsat International Inc.

“But in terms of building a port or a railway, investing in natural resource development I have far less concern and I would love to see the Canadian government engaging with major Chinese companies about the opportunities for partnerships to develop the Port of Churchill, develop a rail line, build a new port at Tuktoyaktuk, build a transshipment port at St. John’s, Newfoundland, to service the Northwest Passage.”

Lasserre, however, said he is not sure major Chinese investment in such key Arctic infrastructure would be met with much enthusiasm among certain segments of the Canadian population.

“Any Chinese endeavour in the Canadian Arctic is viewed with suspicion by a small part of the Canadian public opinion and by some circles in the Canadian government,” Lasserre said.

However, he said such opposition would be hard to justify given the government’s push to develop economic ties with China and the obvious need for massive infrastructure investment in the Port of Churchill and the rail line that leads to it from the Canadian Prairies and other parts of the Canadian Arctic.

‘Respect, cooperation and sustainability’

The Chinese embassy in Ottawa declined to say whether there is any interest by Chinese companies in acquiring the Port of Churchill.

When it comes to the Arctic, Chinese officials say the development of the region “concerns the future of mankind.”

“As a responsible major country, China has always put the common interests of mankind first,” the statement from the embassy said.

“China participates in Arctic affairs based on the three major policy principles of respect, cooperation and sustainability, and is committed to cooperate with related countries and organizations, enhance protection of Arctic ecological environment, continuously deepen scientific exploration in the Arctic region, rationally develop and utilize Arctic resources in accordance with law, and improve the Arctic governance system and mechanism, so as to jointly safeguard Arctic peace and stability.”

These principles are in line with the spirit of the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, the embassy said.

In a statement sent to Radio Canada International, Merv Tweed, President, OmniTRAX Canada, said the company has not finalized the sale of the rail line and port assets.

“We’ve been very clear throughout the process that we’re willing to hear from any interested buyers,” Tweed said. “We will not provide details as to the current status of any sale negotiations, or the parties involved in those discussions, at this time.”

No quarrel with Beijing over the Northwest Passage

There is another advantage to encouraging Chinese companies invest in the Canadian Arctic infrastructure, Byers said.

Unlike the United States, China does not question Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage or Russia’s sovereignty over the Northeast Passage, or the Northern Sea Route, as it is also known.

“China doesn’t have any interest in challenging Canada’s or Russia’s claim because commercial shipping in order to be safe and efficient requires the close cooperation of the coastal state,” Byers said. “Chinese shipping companies need Canadian charts, they need Canadian weather and ice forecasting, they need Canadian search and rescue, and one day they will need access to Canadian ports.”

On top of that, China would be concerned about Canada losing its legal position in the Northwest Passage because Beijing has the exact same position with regards to the Hainan Strait between Hainan Island and southern mainland China, Byers said.

“Both Canada and China claim that their respective straits or passages are internal waters,” Byers said. “And both countries face the same legal opponent: namely the United States.”

This means that China has both practical and legal reasons not to undermine Canadian claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, Byers said.

“It doesn’t want to have the negative precedent that would result if Canada were to lose its claim to the Northwest Passage,” Byers said. “That would hurt China with regards to Hainan Strait, that would be a detriment to China legally.”

In fact, when the Chinese government sent its icebreaker, Xuelong, through the Northwest Passage just a few weeks ago, it asked Canada’s permission, which was promptly granted, Byers said.

No competition to Panama Canal

In the meantime, Byers cautions that the Northwest Passage, which offers a 7,000-kilometre shortcut between Northeast Asia and the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, is unlikely to become anywhere near as important for maritime shipping as the traditional routes through the Malacca Strait or the Panama Canal.

“I don’t imagine that the Northwest Passage will compete in a significant way with the Panama Canal in my lifetime,” Byers said. “But I certainly expect that we will see first dozens and dozens more ships each summer and, perhaps, in the next decade or two, hundreds and hundreds more vessels. But those are tiny numbers compared to major shipping routes.”

Nevertheless, that means that Canada must work with countries like China and the U.S. to make sure that it has a safe route through the Arctic, he said.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: How Arctic shipping could boost Canada’s trade relationship with Asia, Radio Canada International

China: China’s Belt and Road initiative moves into Arctic, blog by Mia Bennett

Finland: Nord Stream 2 applies for Finnish building permit to build gas pipeline, Yle News

Norway: ‘We will come back’, Statoil says after disappointing results in Barents Sea, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia: Chinese company confirms interest in trans-Arctic shipping to Arkhangelsk, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden: Volvo to go all electric starting in 2019, Radio Sweden

United States: U.S. transportation secretary announces efforts to speed up project development in Alaska, Alaska Dispatch News

The federal government is ready to sit down with Inuit leaders to discuss the creation of an Inuit-managed protected area in a crucial Arctic habitat located in the waters between Canada and Greenland, Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard Dominic LeBlanc said Monday.

LeBlanc was reacting to a series of recommendations made last week by the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s Pikialasorsuaq Commission to create a new marine protected area in the North Water Polynya, known as Pikialasorsuaq in Inuktitut, designated and co-managed by the Inuit of Canada and Greenland.

The North Water Polynya is an area of year-around open water surrounded by sea ice between Canada’s Ellesmere Island and the northwestern coast of Greenland.

It is one of the most biologically productive areas in the circumpolar Arctic and is a breeding ground and migration area for animals such as narwhal, beluga, walrus, bowhead whales and migratory birds.

It is also of tremendous cultural and economic importance for the Inuit who have depended on its bounty for their survival for millennia.

Open to dialogue

LeBlanc said Canada values its relationship with Greenland and the Liberal government would look to support the commission’s Inuit-driven process “in the best way possible.”

“We acknowledge the 2017 report from the Pikialasorsuaq Commission on the North Water Polynya and look forward to discussing it with Inuit leaders,” LeBlanc told Radio Canada International in an emailed statement.

“Our government is supportive of Indigenous leadership and collaboration on marine conservation initiatives, including protected areas.”

Collaboration with Indigenous communities on marine conservation initiatives has been a fundamental aspect of the two existing Arctic marine protected areas: in the Western Arctic (Inuvialuit Settlement Region) as well as the recently announced Tallurutiup Imanga (Lancaster Sound) National Marine Conservation Area in the Eastern Arctic, LeBlanc said.

“We will look to this report and Inuit leadership to determine if and what mechanisms will be the best fit for partnership in future management of marine areas in the North,” he added.

Erasing borders between Inuit communities in Canada and Greenland

The Pikialasorsuaq Commission also wants Canada and Denmark to reinstate the free movement between historically connected Inuit communities on the Canadian and Greenlandic coastlines, said Okalik Eegeesiak, ICC chair and Pikialasorsuaq international commissioner.

Ever since governments in Ottawa and Copenhagen started playing more prominent roles in the lives of their Inuit citizens, their travel across the borders has become more and more restricted, especially because of security concerns following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Eegeesiak said in a phone interview from Nunavut’s capital Iqaluit.

“We do not have passport offices in our small communities so these travel restrictions have impacted our family ties, it has impacted our cultural ties and we would like to see freer travel across the borders,” Eegeesiak said.

Lifting or easing these restrictions could be seen as part of the reconciliation efforts by Ottawa leading to Inuit self-determination, she said.

“We hope that the Canadian government will offer to take the lead in promoting the relationship and partnership with our communities,” Eegeesiak said.

There has been less and less direct contact between the coastal communities of Nunavut and Greenland because the Inuit respect the laws and regulations restricting travel, she said.

Long way to Greenland

There are no direct flights between Nunavut and Greenland, Eegeesiak said.

For example, an Inuk from the community of Grise Fjord on Ellesmere Island wishing to visit friends and family in Pituffik, Greenland, about 365 kilometres east across the Baffin Bay, would have to first fly 1,500 kilometres south to Iqaluit, then more than 2,000 kilometres south to either Ottawa or Montreal.

From there that person would need to catch a flight east across the Atlantic Ocean to either Copenhagen, Denmark, (5788km) or Reykjavik, Iceland, (3760km), only to take another flight back across the ocean to Nuuk, Greenland (1436km from Reykjavik or 3537km from Copenhagen). From Nuuk that’s another 1,503km flight north to Pituffik, and then that same journey back to Grise Fjord.

“We’d like to re-establish family ties, we’d like to relearn from each other our cultural heritage and make a positive impact for the area in terms of monitoring and managing the area on behalf of our respective governments,” Eegeesiak said.

Hope of good news for ICC meeting in Alaska

The governments of Canada, Denmark, Greenland and Nunavut were informally briefed on the recommendations of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission and the commissioners hope that these governments will be open to negotiating with the commission in the near future, Eegeesiak said.

“One of the milestones in terms of timelines would be by the next ICC general assembly, which is in July 2018 in Utqiagvik, Alaska, where we could hopefully report some positive progress in the recommendations in working with governments and consulting with our communities,” Eegeesiak said.

Related stories from around the North:

Negotiations on a landmark agreement for the Arctic concluded last week when the five Arctic coastal states plus Iceland, the European Union, and three Asian countries with major ocean trawling fleets agreed to prohibit commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) for the next sixteen years. The agreement builds on the 2015 Arctic Fisheries Declaration signed by five Arctic coastal states – the U.S., Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark – to enact a moratorium on fishing in the CAO until more international mechanisms were in place to safeguard its fish stocks.

Last week’s agreement also responds affirmatively to a letter signed by over 2,000 scientists five years ago, which called for delaying fishing “until such time as the biology and ecology of the region are understood sufficiently well to allow for setting scientifically sound catch levels.”

Surrounding the North Pole, the CAO sits beyond any the jurisdiction of any single country. This means it constitutes part of the high seas, which account for approximately 60% of the world’s oceans. For the most part, these areas are found beyond countries’ 200-mile exclusive economic zones extending from their shorelines.

A free-for-all

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the main treaty governing use of the world’s oceans, notes that “the high seas are open to all States,” giving all of the world’s 195 countries the freedom to fish in these remote, often treacherous waters.

The free-for-fall nature of the high seas has led to exploitation of their fisheries, particularly as the technology has improved to allow fishing fleets to reach farther and deeper than ever before. A report published by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in 2006 found that two-thirds of the world’s high seas fish stocks were being overfished, including species like Patagonian toothfish and orange roughy.

Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean are not overfished, as no commercial activity occurs in its often icebound waters. The chairman’s statement from last week’s meeting of the negotiating parties in Washington, D.C., which was the sixth meeting in two years during which the agreement was discussed, explained: “Commercial fishing has never been known to occur in this area, nor is it likely to occur in the near future. However, given the changing conditions of the Arctic Ocean, the governments in question developed this Agreement in accordance with the precautionary approach to fisheries management.”

Aiming for the North Pole

Essentially, there’s a worry that as sea ice retreats, the world’s commercial fishing fleets will penetrate farther north. They would be following fish stocks that are shifting closer to the North Pole as they seek out cooler waters in the face of a warming ocean.

In recent years, less of the Arctic’s high seas have been covered by sea ice. The portion of the CAO where sea ice cover is the lowest is just north of the Bering Strait, close to the Pacific Ocean and within reach of Asian shipping fleets. In September of recent years when sea ice reaches its annual minimum, this area has generally consisted of open water.

A common concern

To avoid the possibility of imminent overfishing in the increasingly accessible CAO, an area the size of the Mediterranean Sea, nine countries and the EU agreed that until scientists can better study fish stocks in the area, no commercial fishing should be allowed. Their worry was deep enough that it even brought the U.S. and Russia, whose relations are at their worse point since the Cold War, together to the table to agree on an issue of common concern.

You might be wondering why, besides the six Arctic states, only three other countries and the EU were involved in the negotiations of the CAO fisheries agreement. In short, it’s because those three countries – Japan, South Korea, China (including Taiwan) – accounted for 45% of the world’s high-seas landed value between 2000 and 2010, according to a paper published in Scientific Reports. Add into the mix Spain and France, the EU countries with the two biggest fishing fleets, and that figure grows to 54%.

If the CAO agreement were to widen its circle of signatories, Chile, the Philippines, and Indonesia should probably be involved, since they are the other three countries along with the U.S. that round out the list of the world’s top ten countries fishing in the high seas. Together, these nations capture a whopping 71% of the world’s high-seas landed values.

Questions with no answers yet

Before building on the newfound success of the CAO fisheries agreement, all of the negotiating countries need to sign it. If and when they do, scientists, indigenous peoples, fishermen, and other people with knowledge of Arctic fisheries will have their work cut out for them over the next sixteen years.

They’ll have to figure out the answers to questions like: How will commercial fishing in the CAO affect polar bears, seals, whales, and other marine mammals? How might emissions and noise from commercial fishing fleets affect marine species, along with the people who live in the Arctic Ocean? What would be the economic and environmental consequences of keeping the CAO closed to commercial fishing indefinitely? How vulnerable is the shallow Arctic Ocean to deep-sea trawling?

While these issues and many others will require a great deal of research, at least the CAO has been given a little over a decade and a half of a respite from commercial fishing until more is known about its effects.

The same can’t be said for offshore oil drilling in the Arctic: last week, Italian oil company Eni received the first permit from the U.S. federal government in two years for exploration off Alaska’s north coast, while the Senate also voted to allow drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to, in theory, help pay for Alaska’s $1.5 trillion tax cut.

Stricly speaking for the Arctic environment, last week marked two steps forward, one step back.

This post first appeared on Cryopolitics, an Arctic News and Analysis blog.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Arctic nations and fishing powers sign ‘historic’ agreement on fishery, Radio Canada International

Iceland:  Iceland blasts Arctic Five for exclusion from fishing agreement, Eye on the Arctic

Norway:  Deal protects Arctic waters around Svalbard, Norway from fishing, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia: Russian fisheries say they will safeguard Arctic stocks, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden:  Record numbers for Swedish wild salmon, Radio Sweden

United States:  Fishing ban in international Arctic waters remains elusive, Alaska Dispatch News

In Utqiaġvik (Barrow), Alaska, the ocean was frozen as far as I could see. It was March, the time of year when Arctic sea ice reaches its maximum extent. A few hundred feet away from the shore, an American flag flapped in the wind at the country’s northernmost post office.

People came and went, mailing letters and picking up packages, just as they do at the nation’s 31,584 other post offices. A few blocks away, the smell of grease and soy sauce hung in the air over a Korean-run Chinese-American restaurant preparing for the dinner rush.

The same distance in the other direction, inside the town’s cultural center, women were sewing together a sealskin boat with tough, sinewy threads made from caribou guts. Signs around town warned of polar bear sightings.

Whitehorse, Yukon

In Whitehorse, Yukon, I checked into the sole hostel in town after walking from the airport through a snowy glade of trees. The young man in the bunk above me was from China and had come up here from southern Canada after hearing of a job opportunity in a pizza restaurant. Having left my bags, I walked through town towards the grocery store.

This being early spring, the main tourist draws were closed, but it was warm enough for a group of young men to be standing around talking outside the Salvation Army thrift store. Not far away was a doner shop and a mural of Bob Marley whose bright colors popped against the white snow and blue sky.

I bought a can of soup for dinner at the sprawling grocery store, where prices were still relatively low thanks to a good road connection with the rest of Canada. A Greyhound bus even serves this town six times a week to and from Prince George (though, with limited demand, may end next year).

Cruises in the Arctic may be up, but overland travel along the famous Dempster Highway that starts in the Yukon is way down even though the road now extends all the way to the Arctic Ocean.

Qaqortoq, Greenland

In Qaqortoq, Greenland, teenagers hung outside the grocery store knocking back sodas and munching on hot dogs, the Danish fast food staple. Some kids looked traditionally Greenlandic, a few Danish, and others were somewhere in between: deep brown eyes and big rosy cheeks set off by fiery red hair and freckles.

Down the hill, fishermen smoked cigarettes and sold the last of their morning catch at the fish market. Inside the town’s tannery, well-dressed women sewed pieces of brightly colored sealskin together into fine clothes.

Later, once darkness fell, the northern lights flickered over the soccer stadium, but no one came outside to look. It was, after all, just another night in the north.

These are just a few of my memories this year from my travels in the Arctic. I was fortunate enough to make it up to the region three times, visiting Utqiaġvik (Barrow), Alaska; the Canadian Arctic (Whitehorse, Yukon and Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories); and a few settlements in southern Greenland (Qaqortoq, Kassiarsuq, and Narsarsuaq).

Traveling from Scotland to California, I also passed through the uncomfortably crowded Keflavik International Airport, which has become a major hub for US-Europe travel thanks to Iceland-based WOW Air’s efforts. I had barely just enough time to stock up on chocolate-covered licorice and fill my water bottle for the long flight at the airport’s sole, tepid fountain.

No single narrative

The Arctic is often depicted as a uniformly icy place with indigenous peoples all facing the same, climatically driven hardships. But like any region in the world, people’s stories cannot be reduced to a single narrative.

For instance, in Greenland, small towns are struggling to keep their populations as people move in large numbers to the capital, Nuuk, and sometimes even on to Copenhagen and New York.

Meanwhile in parts of northern Canada and Alaska, there isn’t enough housing to support the growing Inuit and Aboriginal population. And in Iceland, enough residents are concerned about the impact of the rapidly rising number of visitors that a tax has been floated.

Urbanization, overcrowding, and excess tourism aren’t necessarily issues that get top billing in discussions of Arctic affairs. But for all the challenges climate change presents, the Arctic’s four million residents have other worries, too – and also other hopes. In Utqiaġvik, Wesley Aiken, an Iñupiat Elder expressed his optimism  about the chances for increased oil and gas drilling in northern Alaska. He offered, “I’m glad these young people are willing to go further out on the land – not the ocean. If they open so-called Alaska Native Wildlife Refuge – that one’s got natural gas out there. There must be something out there.”

To reflect on what I observed in the Arctic this year, earlier this month, I spoke with Eilís Quinn of Radio Canada International for her annual news roundup of the year in the Arctic. We talked about what I found to be the top two stories in the Arctic, a major story that went underreported, and why American participation in the Arctic Council seems to have continued relatively undisturbed by the chaos in the Trump White House. I also shared some of my thoughts on what I think 2018 holds for the Arctic.

Some of my main points are listed below.

Top two news stories in the Arctic

• The opening of the Inuvik-Tuktoyaktuk Highway in Canada’s Northwest Territories
• The signing of a ban on commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean

The most underreported story in the Arctic

• The slow but steady growth of Russian Arctic oil and gas exploration, both on and offshore, which is now close to eclipsing Alaska’s North Slope in barrels per day

What does 2018 hold?

• First things first: the consequences of the tax bill’s permission for drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
• The long-awaited opening of the Canadian High Arctic Research Station
• Developments along Russia’s Northern Sea Route, where the government may decide to either nationalize oil and gas shipping or make the passage more open to the world.

Thanks for a great year, and see you in 2018.

This post first appeared on Cryopolitics, an Arctic News and Analysis blog.

2017 Arctic year in review:

Cooperation, conciliation & Trudeau’s lashing by the NWT, Interview with blogger Heather Exner-Pirot

Fishing diplomacy, rethinking China & how Twitter is improving northern news, Interview with blogger Mathieu Landriault

Russian oil, cooperation over commerce & Canada’s Arctic highway, Interview with blogger Mia Bennett

Despite rising tensions with Russia in Eastern Europe, the Baltics and more recently in the United Kingdom, NATO would like to keep the Arctic an area of low tensions, the chief of the North Atlantic Alliance said Wednesday.

“We used to say that in the High North we have low tensions,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters during a joint press conference with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. “And I think we should continue to strive for avoiding an arms race and higher tensions in the High North.”

At the same time the alliance needs to respond to the increased Russian military presence in the North Atlantic and the Arctic regions with more of its own naval forces, said Stoltenberg who was in Ottawa for a two-day visit.

“Therefore part of the adaptation of NATO is that we are also increasing our naval capabilities, including the High North,” Stoltenberg said.

Arctic focus

Trudeau said the question of the Arctic was thoroughly discussed during his meeting with Stoltenberg.

“We had a very positive discussion on further engagement by NATO in the North,” said Trudeau.

Given the impacts of climate change and greater navigability in the Arctic waters, Canada and NATO have to continue to collaborate and coordinate their actions in the North, Trudeau said.

“I very much look forward to working with NATO as Canada has always been a strong NATO ally and will continue to be particularly in the areas where there is a natural fit like protecting our Arctic Oceans,” Trudeau said.

“I know that there is a new model and a new approach coming down the pipeline and we’ll be part of that,” Trudeau added responding to a question in French.

Reviving Atlantic Command

Rob Huebert, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary and a senior research fellow with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, said Trudeau’s cryptic comments about the new model or approach left him wondering whether NATO plans to resuscitate a Norwegian proposal for the alliance to focus more on the Arctic.

Norway wanted to have greater shared intelligence focused on Russian activities in the Arctic and was pushing for a separate NATO Arctic Command, Huebert said.

However, Stoltenberg pointed out that the alliance is talking about recreating its Atlantic Command with a specific focus on the North Atlantic.

The idea of recreating the command harkens back to the days of the Cold War, Huebert said.

“It was stood down, as the Cold War progressed and particularly as the Russian navy disintegrated into nothingness, there wasn’t any need to protect the sea lines of communications,” Huebert said. “What they are doing, they are just reinvigorating what existed during the Cold War.”

‘Firm, strong, predictable’

However, NATO doesn’t want a new Cold War or a new arms race, Stoltenberg said.

“We’re focused on how we can respond in a firm, strong, predictable, but also measured and defensive way,” Stoltenberg said. “Russia is there to stay, Russia is our neighbour so we will continue to strive for a more constructive relationship with Russia.”

When asked how NATO can square its desire to have better relations with Russia when the Kremlin continues to flex its muscles, particularly in the Baltic region, where it conducted major military drills just a day after leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania met with President Donald Trump in Washington, Stoltenberg said that every nation, including Russia has a right to exercise its military forces.

“But we will follow Russia’s exercises closely and we will stay vigilant, and we are also increasing the readiness of our forces, especially in the Baltic region where we have deployed combat or battle troops already,” Stoltenberg said.

Pattern of behaviour

The Kremlin’s actions are part of a pattern of behaviour of a more assertive Russia, which has invested heavily in new military equipment, modernized its forces, which are exercising more, including with nuclear forces, integrating exercises with nuclear capabilities with conventional capabilities, Stoltenberg said.

Moscow has also used its military forces against Ukraine and to prop up the regime of Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, as well as launching cyberattacks and meddling in national democratic processes, Stoltenberg said.

However, Russia has underestimated NATO’s resolve and unity, Stoltenberg said.

“As a direct response to their illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilizing efforts against Ukraine we have implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence since the end of the Cold War, including deploying combat-ready battle groups in the Baltic countries, one of them led by Canada,” Stoltenberg said.

“We have more forces, more ready forces and we have also increased defence spending across Europe and Canada for the first time in many-many years.”

“Reckless behavior”

On top of that, following the Salisbury incident, NATO allies have in a coordinated way expelled dozens of Russian diplomats and several alliance members have enacted economic sanctions against Russia for its “reckless behavior” in Ukraine and other places, Stoltenberg said.

However, when asked whether the alliance will consider beefing up sanctions against Russia at its next summit in Brussels, Stoltenberg said the question of economic sanctions falls outside the purview of NATO and should be discussed by the European Union and individual countries.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Surveillance and search and rescue top Canada’s Arctic defence priorities, Radio Canada International

Finland: Finnish Defence Minister slams government over planned defence spending cuts, Yle News

Norway:  Norway says Russia’s mock attack on Arctic radar troubles stability in the North, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia: Russia’s Northern Fleet drills submarine hunt in Barents Sea, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden: Swedish military wants to double in size, Radio Sweden

United States:  Trump signs defense bill to allow more missile interceptors in Alaska, Alaska Public Media

China’s growing involvement and interest in the Arctic should not be seen as a cause for concern in Canada even if certain aspects of Chinese policy need much closer scrutiny, say Canadian experts.

Dozens of academics, civilian and military government officials, foreign diplomats and industry representatives braved an ice storm that walloped much of southern Ontario and Quebec on Monday to participate in a panel discussion on China’s role in the Arctic at the University of Ottawa organized by the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI).

Chinese investment and involvement in the Arctic has to be welcomed but on Canadian terms, said Adam Lajeunesse, the Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Canadian Arctic Marine Security Policy with the Mulroney Institute of Government at St. Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia.

“Chinese interests are not necessarily to be feared, there is no evidence to lead one to believe that there are any malicious intents here,” said Lajeunesse, one of the co-authors of a recently published book entitled China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada.

“The Chinese should be brought into the Arctic within a Western framework, within a framework that can be beneficial and agreeable to Canada. It has to be done very carefully but it can be done.”

(Click here to listen to the presentation by Adam Lajeunesse)

Arctic policy white paper

Chinese policy in the Arctic was outlined in a white paper released in January, the first policy paper released by Beijing on a region outside of China, Lajeunesse said.

“It’s a big one, it reflects the level of interest that China has in the region both at the present and, of course, looking into the future,” Lajeunesse said.

“China clearly sees the Arctic as an important part of its future global strategy.”

It’s a very thorough policy document that hits all the right notes, Lajeunesse said.

“The entire policy talks about safeguarding peace, stability, promotion of development in the Arctic, talking about the unique natural environment and the need to protect this, about the historic traditions of the Indigenous peoples… about the commitment to the existing frameworks of international law, multinational, bilateral mechanisms,” Lajeunesse said. “It is a very cosy, very rosy, very liberal document.”

Smoke and mirrors or genuine desire for cooperation?

The question that many in Canada and around the world ask is whether the policy document represents real Chinese intent or is all smoke and mirrors aimed at lulling Arctic countries into a false sense of security, Lajeunesse said.

“It could be both, at the end of the day I would argue if you look at the intent and tone, it doesn’t really matter whether this is legitimate, sincere Chinese policy, or whether this is something the Chinese are writing for our intent,” Lajeunesse said.

“The reason it doesn’t matter is because the Chinese have made it very clear, both in this policy and in almost everything they have said over the last ten years, that they are here to work with the Arctic states.”

The imperative of cooperation with circumpolar states is driven by the harsh realities of the Arctic, he said.

“What they are doing very clearly they are pursuing the path of least resistance,” Lajeunesse said. “If they want Arctic resources, if they want shipping routes, they cannot barge in and take it. They cannot realistically do that, they must play by our rules.”

Clear policy goals

The newly released Chinese Arctic policy, looks specifically at Arctic shipping, Arctic resource development, governance and northern science.

“What makes this policy so impactful, however, is not just that it is thorough and a novel approach to foreign policy-making but that it is actually backed up by resources,” Lajeunesse said. “The Chinese quite literally are putting their money where their mouth is.”

One of Beijing’s main goals is to begin linking China to the rest of the world through the increasingly ice-free waters of the Arctic, Lajeunesse said.

“The Chinese are looking forward to building infrastructure, expanding shipping lanes and using new shipping routes, primarily over northern Russia but also conceivably through the Arctic Archipelago of Canada to connect China to the rest of the world,” Lajeunesse said.

Arctic science is another area that has received a lot of emphasis in Beijing’s policy document for a couple of reasons, Lajeunesse said.

“First, is that it’s genuinely important and the Chinese see Arctic science as a way of gaging, measuring global climate change, predicting weather patterns over China,” Lajeunesse said.

“But selling Chinese policy… is also a good way to sell Chinese policy more broadly to the West because we as a people are generally more amenable to hearing about China’s interest in science than, perhaps, we are in resources and shipping.”

Win-win partnership

In any case, there is room for a constructive partnership with China in the Arctic, Lajeunesse said.

“They have things that we need and we have things that they need,” Lajeunesse said. “There is an interest in China in using the Northwest Passage. The Xuelong, the Chinese icebreaker was there recently. Increased Chinese shipping is something that may help Canada over the long run.”

Canada has a very limited infrastructure in the region and could profit from targeted Chinese investment in upgrading and building that infrastructure, he said.

“Chinese money as part of this Polar Silk Road, if properly managed, can go to establishing the infrastructure that we have been trying as a nation to establish since John Diefenbaker in the 1960s,” Lajeunesse said.

Whitney Lackenbauer, a professor in the Department of History and co-director of the Centre for Foreign Policy and Federalism at the University of Waterloo, said a lot of the Arctic infrastructure projects are high-risk and very long-term projects that will force the various levels of government to look for outside sources of financing and China with its experience of investing in the Russian Arctic is an obvious candidate.

Increased Chinese shipping activity in the Canadian Arctic also does not necessarily pose any problems for Canada’s sovereignty claims over the Northwest Passage, which is considered an international strait by the United States.

“The Chinese Arctic policy statement has repeatedly emphasized strong adherence to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, general international law and explicitly acknowledges how each of the Arctic states not only has territorial sovereign rights but also maritime sovereignty rights,” said Lackenbauer who specializes in issues of Arctic sovereignty.

Will China’s attitude change?

The longer term question is whether China will continue to adhere to these norms and accept the Arctic states’ interpretation of these laws or whether it will challenge these interpretations with its own take on them as it has done in other regions of the world, Lackenbauer said.

That question needs to be answered in a much more strategic context of dealing with China’s ascendance as a global power, he said.

Despite China having released an Arctic policy paper, the region is not a high priority for Beijing, which has much bigger strategic challenges closer to its shores, Lackenbauer argued.

“Yes, their interest has grown but this is by no means dominating Chinese thinking and the Arctic is not the new centre of gravity for China to emerge as a major global power,” Lackenbauer said.

In the meantime, Lajeunesse said China has to be forced or at least convinced to use Canadian resources – icebreaking services, ice reporting services, weather forecasting, hydrographic work – for its activities in the Canadian Arctic.

“As soon as we don’t provide these things, as soon as we don’t put ‘the boots on the ground,’ as soon as the Chinese feel they need to bring their own icebreakers in and provide their own ice reporting so on and so forth, that’s the day we begin to lose at least de facto sovereignty and therefore we begin to lose a little bit of control over the north,” Lajeunesse said.

Canada also needs a certain amount of constabulary power to back up its sovereignty for when or if the Chinese decide to not play by Canadian rules, he said.

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: Fishing diplomacy, rethinking China & how Twitter is improving northern news : 2017 Arctic Year in Review, Eye on the Arctic

China: China & the Arctic: Why the focus on international law matters,  Blog by Timo Koivurova

Finland:  Finland courts US rivals Russia and China in bid for key role in Arctic power game, Deutsche Welle’s Iceblogger

Iceland: Arctic nations and fishing powers sign ‘historic’ agreement on fishery, Radio Canada International

Norway: Can Barents region become a superhub on China’s Arctic Silk Road?, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia: China wants in on Russian wind park project, The Independent Barents Observer

United States: Big questions emerge over $43 billion gas-export deal between Alaska and China, Alaska Dispatch News

In a move that reflects the growing tensions between Russia and the West, Ottawa quietly announced last week that it is extending the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ) to cover all of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

The new CADIZ, which came into effect as of 9:01 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on May 24, will facilitate increased awareness of the air traffic approaching and operating in Canada’s sovereign airspace, officials said.

“Canada remains committed to supporting the North American Aerospace Defense Command,” Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said in a statement. “The alignment of the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone with our sovereign airspace and its approaches is another expression of our responsibility for the Arctic.”

Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ) are used by states to monitor and identify aircraft approaching their sovereign airspace and assess possible threats to national security and such zones are a common practice.

Cold War blind spot

Retired Gen. Tom Lawson said many Canadians would be surprised to learn that all through much of the Cold War technological limitations did not allow NORAD to effectively monitor all of the Canadian Arctic airspace.

When the Canadian and U.S. governments set up the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in late 1950s to detect incoming Soviet bombers and missiles, the radar network stretching from northwestern Alaska to eastern Baffin Island, still left out big parts of the High Canadian Arctic, Lawson said.

However, technological advances in sensors and satellite technology now allow the military to not only include all of Canada’s landmass but see hundreds of miles beyond our shores, he said.

The new ADIZ stretches anywhere from a hundred to a couple of hundred nautical miles off shore to give NORAD enough time to scramble fighter planes to intercept any unidentified aircraft that approaches the Canadian airspace, Lawson said.

Message for Russia: ‘Expect to be intercepted’

The latest measure comes as Russia has stepped up its long range bomber patrols along the North American Arctic, especially in the last decade, Lawson said.

“What we see is not only a far more aggressive stance by President Putin but we also see this backed up by all kinds of Russian aviation: bombers and electronic warfare aircraft and refuellers coming directly towards the North,” Lawson said.

“This is really a statement by NORAD especially to Russia that not only are we monitoring using all the most modern equipment but you can expect to be intercepted as you approach Canadian territory anywhere in the Arctic.”

Related stories from around the North:

Canada: NATO wants to keep the Arctic an area of low tensions, Radio Canada International

Denmark: Denmark’s new defence agreement renews focus on protecting the Baltic, Radio Canada International

Finland: Finland, Sweden and US building three-way defence ties, Yle News

Norway: Simulated attack on Northern Norway targets by Russian bombers revealed, The Independent Barents Observer

Russia: Russian sub test-fires largest volley of nuclear missiles since Cold War, The Independent Barents Observer

Sweden: Sweden issues first brochure on war and crisis preparedness since Cold War, Radio Sweden

United States: American fighter jets intercept Russian bombers outside Alaska, Alaska Public Media